# 1nc – wake r1

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### 1NC – T

#### Topical affirmatives must increase prohibitions on anticompetitive business practices by the private sector by at least expanding the scope of core antitrust laws.

#### The affirmative is not topical. “United States federal government” means the three branches of the central government – the affirmative does not advocate action by the USFG.

Organisation OECD for Economic Co-operation and Development Council ’87 “United States,” *The Control and Management of Government Expenditure*, p. 179]

1. Political and organisational structure of government

The United States of America is a federal republic consisting of 50 states. States have their own constitutions and within each State there are at least two additional levels of government, generally designated as counties and cities, towns or villages. The relationships between different levels of government are complex and varied (see Section B for more information).

The Federal Government is composed of **three branches**: the legislative branch, the executive branch, and the judicial branch. Budgetary decisionmaking is shared primarily by the legislative and executive branches. The general structure of these two branches relative to budget formulation and execution is as follows.

#### The Sherman, Clayton, and FTC act are the core antitrust laws.

Gibbs ‘ND [Gibbs Law Group; “The Sherman Antitrust Act”; https://www.classlawgroup.com/antitrust/federal-laws/sherman-act/; AS]

The Sherman Antitrust Act is one of three core federal antitrust laws, along with the Clayton Antitrust Act and the Federal Trade Commission Act.

#### Prohibitions are laws.

Dictionary.com ‘ND [Dictionary.com; “Prohibition” https://www.dictionary.com/browse/prohibition; AS]

a law or decree that forbids.

#### Their interpretation explodes predictable limits – non-topical advocacies encourage the affirmative to dodge negative strategies, which are all based on a predictable reading of the resolution. The negative requires pre-round research in order to stand a chance against the affirmative’s infinite preparation and use of traditional standards of debate such as permutations – including their affirmative makes negative research an impossibility, even if we have “ground” to debate them. It greenlights any methodology or orientation that is tangentially related to the topic – negative preparation requires in depth case negatives.

#### Two impacts:

#### Procedural fairness – debate is a game and we are all here to win – debate is a competitive activity and requires game values to function – this is the largest impact – we have all chosen to spend our weekend here in order to compete.

#### Clash – you should privilege debate over different political paradigms over endorsing any one political paradigm – unflinching commitments ignore the complexity and partiality of any political theory. Promoting clash is key to interrogate complex issues, problematize solutions, and actualize any benefits of debate

### 1NC – Sovereignty K

#### The aff treats blackness as in but not of world order. They pose a structural conflict between ordering and sovereignty, versus disordering, dispossession, and non-relationality. This narrative denies the world-making capacity of decolonization and the principle of self-determination.

Adom **GETACHEW** Poli Sci @ Chicago **’19** *Worldmaking after Empire* p. 14-18

Just three years after Ghana’s achievement of independence, seventeen African states joined the United Nations, marking the high point of decolonization in the Black Atlantic world. In what would come to be called the year of Africa, the newly constituted African bloc in the United Nations successfully led the effort to secure passage of General Assembly resolution 1514, titled “Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples.” The declaration described foreign rule as a violation of human rights, reiterated the right to self-determination, and called for the immediate end of all forms of colonial rule.1 Resolution 1514 offered a complete repudiation of foreign rule and rejected any prerequisites for the attainment of independence. Soon after its passage, the resolution formed the basis of a new committee with broad powers to investigate colonial rule and hear petitions from colonial subjects, making colonial rule subject to international scrutiny and to the demands for self-determination. 2

While 1960 marked a radical rupture in the history of modern international society, it has largely been subsumed in a standard account of decolonization where the transition from empire to nation and the expansion of international society to include new states is a seamless and inevitable development. This account of decolonization is premised on the view that anticolonial nationalists appropriated the language of self-determination from the liberal internationalist tradition of Woodrow Wilson in order to secure independence from alien rule. In adopting the language of liberal self-determination, the nationalists of the colonized world are thought to have mimicked the existing institutional forms of the nation-state. And while decolonization is credited with universalizing this state system, its nationalist and statist premises are viewed as anachronistic in a postnational and increasingly cosmopolitan world order.

Recasting anticolonial nationalism as worldmaking disrupts the central assumptions of this standard account. First, it expands the account of empire beyond alien rule by illustrating the ways black anticolonial critics theorized empire as a structure of international racial hierarchy. Drawing on W.E.B. Du Bois’s famous diagnosis that the “problem of the twentieth century is the problem of the color line,” the central characters of this book drew critical attention to the enduring legacy of racial hierarchy and slavery in the making of modern international society. Second, in response to the political dilemmas international racial hierarchy posed, anticolonial nationalists in Africa and the Caribbean insisted that self-determination required a combination of nation-building and worldmaking. Their vision of a postimperial world order prompted nationalists to create international institutions that could secure the conditions of nondomination. This claim that national independence required international institutions was a key insight of the anticolonial account of self-determination. Finally, recovering their global aspirations highlights the persistence of international hierarchy and outlines new directions for contemporary debates about global political and economic justice. Together, the expanded account of empire, the rethinking of anticolonial nationalism, and the theorization of a postcolonial cosmopolitanism constitute elements of a political theory of decolonization.

Beyond Empire as Alien Rule

As postcolonial states worked to pass resolution 1514 in 1960, historians, philosophers, and political scientists offered their first interpretations of the unprecedented process of decolonization. That same year, the Oxford philosopher John Plamenatz published On Alien Rule and Self-Government, while, across the Atlantic, the Harvard political scientist Rupert Emerson published From Empire to Nation.3 Emerson and Plamenatz sought to explain how “alien rule” suddenly became illegitimate in the twentieth century, and they found their answer in the global diffusion of Western ideals. The delegitimation of alien rule in the mid-twentieth century, Plamenatz argued, was itself a product of the gradual Westernization of the world. European imperial expansion fueled the spread of principles like self-determination, democracy, and freedom and made possible anticolonial nationalists’ critique of alien rule.4 Emerson concurred, arguing that “through global conquest the dominant Western powers worked to reshape the world in their own image and thus roused against themselves the forces of nationalism which are both the bitterest enemies of imperialism and, perversely, its finest fruit.”5

Key tenets of these early interpretations—the emphasis on alien rule, the inattention to the international conditions and context of imperialism, the identification of decolonization with the globalization of the nation-state, and the expansion of international society—continue to shape our understanding of the collapse of territorial empires. From international relations to normative political theory, the recurring emphasis on alien rule conceives of empire as a bilateral relationship between metropole and colony. On this view, empire is a “a system of interaction between two political entities, one of which, the dominant metropole, exerts political control over the internal and external policy—the effective sovereignty—of the other, subordinate periphery.”6 Involuntary subjection, nonreciprocity, and inequality characterize this relationship between the colonized and colonizer. 7 The international component to alien rule is understood as exclusion of the colony from international society.8 Such exclusion differentiates alien rule from other forms of international hegemony that emerge within a rule-bound international order.9 As a result, the international order is conceived as a dual structure that grants metropolitan states membership as sovereign equals and excludes colonies outside of its boundaries. With this bilateral account of imperial domination and a bifurcated view of international society, the alien rule thesis understands self-determination as a double move of overcoming alien rule and achieving inclusion in international society. Empire comes to an end when formerly excluded colonies enter international society as full members, and central to this inclusion is the universalization of the nation-state as the accepted institutional form of self-determination. 10 Twentieth-century decolonization is thus viewed as the culmination of a long history in which the nation-state is progressively globalized and becomes the counterpoint to empire.11

While the empire-to- nation narrative appears to capture the transformations of the international order in the mid-twentieth century, this account of decolonization also obscures the more far-reaching efforts to remake rather than expand international society. Characterizing decolonization as a process of diffusion, in which a “gradual Westernization” of the world took place, blunts anticolonial nationalism’s radical challenge to the four-century- long project of European imperial expansion. Like British prime minister Harold Macmillan’s evocative phrase “the wind of change,” the diffusion narrative naturalizes decolonization, rendering it an irresistible development that necessarily follows from empire.12 Indeed, well before the rapid decline of the British Empire, interwar metropolitan intellectuals and elites coined and adopted the term decolonization to reconcile their imperial past and present with what they believed was an inevitable postimperial future.13 In this early articulation, decolonization was pictured as already immanent within the project of empire and did not signal imperial defeat. Decolonization thus “worked to absorb and deflect the phenomenon it ostensibly described.”14

Rather than a seamless and inevitable transition from empire to nation, anticolonial nationalists refigured decolonization as a radical rupture—one that required a wholesale transformation of the colonized and a reconstitution of the international order. For Kwame Nkrumah, decolonization was not a wind blowing over the African continent but instead a “hurricane of change . . . [that is] razing to the ground the many bastions of colonialism.” 15 From this perspective, “independence means much more than merely being free to fly our own flag and to play our own national anthem. It becomes a reality only in a revolutionary framework.”16 Nkrumah’s vision of decolonization as revolution was directed toward undoing the dependencies that colonial domination left behind. Dependence structured the condition of formerly colonized subjects as well as the relationship between the former colony and the international order. According to Nkrumah, a people “long subjected to foreign domination” become habituated to their dependence.17 The nationalist movement and postcolonial state would combat the economic, political, and moral-psychological forms of colonial dependence through an expansive politics of postcolonial citizenship. 18 This nation-building project, however, was insufficient in a context where dependence also characterized the new nation’s condition in the international order. The hoisting of national flags and singing of national anthems—the mere transfer of power—left intact the economic and political position of new states. Decolonization understood as a revolutionary project thus required remaking the international order that sustained relations of dependence and domination. Nation-building was to be situated and realized through worldmaking.

Nkrumah’s concern with the persistence of domination in the international sphere points to the ways that anticolonial accounts of empire extended beyond alien rule and homed in on the problem of international hierarchy. Anticolonial nationalists argued that a bifurcated system with sovereign and equal members and excluded colonies did not characterize the international order. Instead, colonies and peripheral states were internal to international society but appeared in that space as unequal and subordinated members. For instance, the colonization of Africa in the late nineteenth century was facilitated through international treaties and conferences. In those contexts, African states and political communities were endowed with an international personality that had made possible their domination. Viewed from this perspective, colonization was not experienced as exclusion from but as unequal integration into international society.

Unequal integration conceives of international society as an internally differentiated space that includes sovereign states, quasisovereigns, and colonies, which are organized through relations of hierarchy. The hierarchical ordering of international society ensured that non-European states were not afforded the full rights of membership in international society. The distribution of rights and obligations was such that non-European states and colonies were encumbered with onerous obligations and had only limited or conditional rights. In highlighting the ways that unequal integration is embedded in the formal institutions of international society, this account of hierarchy departs from theories that emphasize how dominant states exercise economic and military authority over states.19 Distinct from hegemony, unequal integration as a constitutive practice of international law produces differential legal and political standing in international society. This unequal international standing functioned as the enabling background of European imperialism. It coincided with and facilitated political and economic domination.

#### Bearing witness to the history of black sovereignty fights antiblack erasure. The Haitian Revolution demonstrates that even those deemed inhuman and unpolitical by others have the right to sovereignty.

Karen **SALT** Director Centre for Research in Race and Rights @ Nottingham **’19** *The Unfinished Revolution: Haiti, Black Sovereignty and Power in the Nineteenth-Century Atlantic World* p.12-35

In a recent, rousing, oft-quoted essay written just after the 2010 earthquake in Haiti, Ulysse argues that Haitians have typically appeared in research as “fractures, as fragments—bodies without minds, heads without bodies, or roving spirits.”33 Turning her eye to the representations in the media of Haiti and Haitians that appeared after the earthquake, Ulysse reads and critiques them for their stereotypical portrayals.34 For Ulysse, these portrayals emerge from “the dominant idea” that “Haitians are irrational, devil-worshipping, progress-resistant, [and] uneducated.” These assumptions are not just a case of blatant primitivism and public disavowal. Too many entities, Ulysse laments, see “Haiti and Haitians [… as] a manifestation of blackness in its worst form.” Why? Its history and its politics. She continues: “The unruly enfant terrible of the Americas defied all European odds and created a disorder of things colonial” in the founding of its state.35 This declaration of independence provided a legible and visible challenge to colonialism and to articulations of whiteness (in its many fluctuations and permutations) that represented blackness (variously defined) and statehood as anathema. The message: blackness and sovereignty don’t mix. This is not just a disavowal of Haiti’s origins. As Dubois, Ulysse and others have extolled, Haiti continues to be portrayed as a politically wrong and even abhorrent thing.36

Although the surge in scholarship on Haiti and the Haitian Revolution has shifted some popular perspectives regarding Haiti, much of this work has provided little evidence of Haiti’s relationship to and influence on black statehood and political thought across the last two centuries. Trouillot picks up on this political silence, amongst other occlusions, in Silencing the Past. In one searing passage, Trouillot makes this link plain, charting the ways that the ontological world view held by many whites and non-whites in Europe and the Americas refused to include a vision of freedom for enslaved Africans and their progeny. He argues that it was not that freedom was imagined as impossible for enslaved Africans (and other people of African descent) as much as it was articulated as a state of being that slaves could never achieve. Even those who countered this world view with more radical and equitable articulations about people, politics, freedom and racial difference (and Trouillot acknowledges that there were some) struggled to imagine any world in which a slave uprising could ever lead to the formation of a black nation-state.37 Unthinkable revolution? Yes. Unthinkable revolution leading to an independent state? Just as impossible—and potentially more dangerous. Ulysse makes this point plain in her NACLA Report essay, “Why Representations of Haiti Matter Now More than Ever.” In assessing the pejorative imaging of Haiti from its origins to the twenty-first century, Ulysse argues that it “had to become colonialism’s bête noire [literally translated as “black beast”] if the sanctity of whiteness were to remain unquestioned.”38

As a nation formed through rebellion, violence and anti-colonialism, Haiti would represent the least “normal” nation in the nineteenth-century Atlantic world as it outlawed slavery from the beginning and articulated, at least on paper, that all of its citizens were politically equal and black. In one of Haiti’s earliest constitutions, all Haitian citizens were legally defined as black, regardless of skin-pigmentation or prior racial categorisation. These political moves and assertions put the nation at odds with the nation-states in the Atlantic that surrounded it. As historian Julia Gaffield succinctly notes in Haitian Connections in the Atlantic World, “the basis of the economic system of the Atlantic world was under attack” after Haiti’s 12-year battle for freedoms, rights and opportunities drew a successful slave revolution and violent anti-colonial struggle into a concentrated fight for independence that would, improbably, defeat the French—while also seeing off challenges from English and Spanish forces who saw an opportunity to take the island by force.39

Although often cast as a ragtag, untrained cadre of blood-thirsty agitators, especially by antagonists in France, England and the USA, Haitian revolutionary leaders (and their representatives) spent considerable time influencing foreign officials, developing new strategic governance models (or building upon older colonial models) and working out how to perform sovereign politics amongst other sovereign nations, while black. For these and other reasons, Haiti was and remains, due to its history, a vastly important political entity.40 As Malick Ghachem notes regarding Haiti’s official declaration of anti-colonial freedom, “the mere existence of Haiti, the very fact of its new ruling class, and the act of the declaration itself—all of these were momentously novel forces in the Atlantic World.”41

In short, it was led by people of African descent who declared in their performance of power and rights that black people could be racialised as black and political. In The Haitian Declaration of Independence: Creation, Context, and Legacy, David Armitage, Julia Gaffield, Laurent Dubois and Erin Zavitz make clear that what could be read as a singular “Declaration of Haitian Independence” should rightfully be seen as “acts” of becoming that took multiple forms and were performed on varied stages. Through song, oral history and in print forms that circulated the Atlantic world, Haitian leaders and Haitian people signalled a refusal to unbecoming.42 The new nation’s very existence ran counter to pejorative assumptions and increasingly vitriolic racist imaginings that systematically rejected the ability of people of African descent to be creative, exhibit intelligence or even understand politics, much less engage in political behaviour and activities. In asserting their rights to sovereignty and working with various tools and circuits of power and production to communicate those rights, Haiti and its officials rewrote the rules about who could and could not be a sovereign body, as well as how that sovereignty would be performed. This book explores that terrain. The Unfinished Revolution: Haiti, Black Sovereignty and Power in the Nineteenth-Century Atlantic World chronicles the ways that Haiti’s black sovereignty moved and morphed in the Atlantic world. Tethered, then, between a kind of “othered” space, Haitian officials would use whatever means were at their disposal to resist closure to and consumption of their independence and power, from letters, photographs, material objects, narratives, diplomatic missives, black and brown bodies, essays, newspaper articles to political performances on the world stage. What emerges from these oppositional, yet imploring demands is a sovereignty that celebrates, even as it rejects, its outlaw status.

In 1853, Benjamin C. Clark, Haitian Commercial Agent to the USA (more on him in later chapters), argues in A Plea for Hayti that Atlantic nation-states, specifically the USA and Britain, failed to recognise and adequately to engage diplomatically with Haiti not simply because the USA’s continued practice of Atlantic racial slavery was until the 1860s incompatible with the anti-slavery demands of the new Haitian nation-state. For Clark, at the heart of the antipathy toward Haiti was a deep resentment of its very existence. Haiti was not merely the product of a successful slave revolt: it was a black nation-state. And this identity made it an oddity within an Atlantic world that had no category for black political entities (in the form either of nations or citizens). Clark suggests that Haiti’s oddness was not just unthinkable: it was outside the bounds of custom and law. In a stirring passage, he stresses that the USA’s failure to engage with Haiti as a sovereign entity was at odds with its engagement with other independent Latin American countries. Clark argues that this differential diplomatic treatment was because “the horrors of St. Domingo were raked up and interposed, and it was contended that these Islanders having achieved their freedom by bloodshed, should forever be regarded as outlaws.”43 And they were not just any outlaws. They were self-avowed black ones who dared to perform their power on a global stage amongst an ocean of white nation-states and their official and unofficial representatives.

Nineteenth-century Haiti’s outward-facing officials and their cognates from various economic industries and artistic sectors performed a form of racial power that utilised older and newly formed networks of influence to reposition and rearticulate Haiti’s presence in the Atlantic world as a black space steeped in political power. Neither organised nor always coherent, this image-making of sovereignty assembled often unstable figurations of control and characterisations of power that when read together formulate a singular black political body that represented (and continues to represent) a sovereignty formed through encounters with and amongst other sovereign nation-states (more on this below). What has been gathered here in one text are the ways that a variety of agents and actants fought for, against, in tandem with and in praise of Haiti’s black sovereignty. Through this examination, what emerges is not a fight for a specific cause but a series of jumbled and, at times, competing strategies for state control.

These strategies (and the encounters that gave birth to them) illuminate the ways in which Haitian officials, their designated political and cultural attendants and external others would use various geopolitical and economic openings within a changing and volatile Caribbean region to configure Haiti. Many nineteenth-century Haitian leaders engaged in Haiti’s international work found their sovereignty consistently compromised by outside agents who treated the nation as an exception in need of external control. Sociologist Alex Dupuy, writing about power and class in twenty-first-century Haiti, provides a roadmap to these earlier sovereignty struggles in Haiti, suggesting that “if by sovereignty we mean the right and the ability of a people and their government to determine their agenda,” then this right and ability is compromised and undermined “when the state is subordinated to the dictates of foreign governments and international financial institutions, and/ or the interests of powerful private foreign and domestic actors who are not accountable to the people or their government.”44 Dupuy’s short list roughly captures the various interests exhibited by foreign officials, government agencies and financial organisations in their more than 200-plus-year encounters with Haiti.

Although nineteenth-century Haitian officials would court, entrap, ensnare, play with and even manipulate the terms of many of the diplomatic and economic state-crafting of their times, other nations also played key roles in these dramas. Here is a short list of some of these political “acts”: the USA engaged in trade embargoes against Haiti in the early 1800s in order to isolate the young nation; France levied a crippling indemnity in 1825 of 150 million francs that forced the former colony to pay its colonial masters for its independence; and US banks took over the nation at the end of the nineteenth century near the start of the US military’s occupation of Haiti that lasted, in total, almost 20 long and violent years.45 By the time the late twentieth-century structural adjustment programmes and internal coups brought Haiti under the protection (or, some would suggest, control) of the United Nations Stabilisation Mission in Haiti (Mission des Nations Unies pour la stabilisation en Haïti or MINU STA H) force and auspices of the US State Department, Haiti had lived through centuries of compromise and undermining—and responded to each episode with even more figurations of black sovereignty.

Some pundits, influenced by accounts in the media and international governance documents that frame Haiti as a failed state, may see my interrogation of sovereignty in Haiti as a naive dream that Haiti could instantiate its own political future. I can anticipate that many of these same people, critical of Haiti and the political aptitude of its leaders, will pick up this book and doubt if a failed state could ever be, or even had ever been, a sovereign one. This book responds to these and similar conjectures with a simple, but important, question: “What makes Haiti a failed state?” Some of those in the development world and within international relations circles point to Haiti’s poverty levels (perhaps reciting the mantra: Haiti is the poorest nation in the western hemisphere) or its lack of institutional infrastructures as examples of its failure. The issues of poverty and infrastructural collapse may be visible in Haiti, but other nations have significant poverty levels and little or no internally coordinated agencies or organisations. What makes Haiti so especially different, so critically difficult, that it merits a charge of failure at its roots or claims by the media of suffering from a “complex web of progress-resistant cultural influences”?46

This line of questioning is not about apportioning blame on others for the ways that various Haitian elites have amassed wealth and allocated resources within Haiti to the detriment of the masses. I raise the spectre of failure to make clear that in repeating Haiti’s purported failure and then reading that failure back into Haiti’s history, critics and supporters alike run the risk of never really understanding the routes that have brought various configurations of the nation into existence. In reading Haiti’s history as a narrative of declension, whose high point is the Haitian Revolution, critics (and even some supporters) repeat the very acts of erasure that many claim silenced the Haitian Revolution for so many years to those outside of Haitian studies.

We must do better by Haiti. We must challenge ourselves to witness Haiti’s history and see its many resistances to charges of “state failure” by its many presence(s) on the world stage. The Unfinished Revolution resists reifying the rhetoric of failure and instead lays bare the ways that its logics echo within criticism of Haiti’s history and its continued political existence. In drawing together a range of documents, actors, nations and entanglements, this book moves conversations about Haiti beyond the polarities that tend to constrain it—i.e., failed black nation on one side and idealised revolutionary spark of radical antislavery and anti-colonialism on the other.

It responds to historical anthropologist and Francophone political theorist Gary Wilder’s call for scholars to offer “clear” speaking about Haiti that attempts to chart its existence without resorting to “overdetermined poles of abject failure and audacious triumph.” Wilder stresses that circulating images of Haiti must be challenged if we—in the widest sense of community—ever hope to silence current articulations of Haiti as a “phantasmic object of fear and desire” that conjure fantastic notions of “political failure, social catastrophe, or natural disaster.”47 In many ways, this book charts the tensions that have emerged from Haiti’s unfinished project of creating a black sovereign nation-state under these conditions.

In a 2010 talk delivered to the United Nations on the international day of remembrance for people brutalised by slavery and the transatlantic slave trade, political theorist and Africana studies scholar Anthony Bogues turns his lens to Haiti and its “archive of freedom.” Bogues argues that in order for the wider public to reframe Haiti as a freedom land, the international community must recognise that Haiti’s revolutionary beginnings contained not one rebellion, but two. The first violent insurrection rejected slavery; the second, occurring years later, drew together a concentrated military force determined to fight against a return to colonialism and imperial control. In the pages that follow, I posit that there was—and remains—a third, and unfinished, revolution in Haiti: sovereignty. Although sovereignty has not emerged as a significant theme examined by scholars, Haitian politics, in general, has garnered critics’ attention. Notably, researchers have produced exceptional new readings of Haiti’s early constitutions (including Toussaint’s pre-Haiti Constitution of 1801).48 These new considerations sit alongside other examinations of diplomacy, such as texts by Ronald Johnson and Ashli White, that seek to understand the struggles of the burgeoning nation to set up and defend its right to existence.49 These works are joined by a wide and varied body of texts that focus on Haiti’s early political manifestations and its interactions with US literary history through examinations of such themes as the significance of the image and military acumen of Toussaint Louverture to black power in the Atlantic world and the writings of particular US authors who have written on or been influenced by Haitian culture and politics, such as Charles Brockden Brown, Herman Melville and Leonora Sansay, or the perspectives from some who spent considerable time in Haiti during the Haitian Revolution, including the British officer Marcus Rainsford.50 Francophone Caribbeanists have also considered the political world of Haiti. These scholars have offered new methods and new source materials that have helped document how the various figurations of early Haiti were rooted/routed through Haitian literature and the cultural and political worlds in the Americas and the wider French empire.51

The above thematic sets of work have been influenced (in some instances, quite noticeably) by additional scholarship on Haiti crafted by social scientists, including the works of David Nicholls, J. Michael Dash, Michel- Rolph Trouillot, Sidney Mintz, Alex Dupuy, Arthur Stinchcombe and Anthony Maingot, each of whom has painstakingly documented tensions around development and political economy with regards to Haiti and Haiti’s place within geopolitical structures of power.52 Aspects of these now classic texts can be found in newer pieces from interdisciplinary investigators, such as the work of Philip Kaisary, who moves within and between law, race and human rights, and Robbie Shilliam, who teases apart the entanglements between international politics, post-coloniality and global movements for decolonisation.53 Both Shilliam and Kaisary, alongside Matthew Smith, have produced nuanced texts focused on the Haitian Revolution, the early Haitian republic and later Haitian history that interrogate issues of Caribbean exile, capitalism, liberty and race. Although, as mentioned, aspects of politics or “the political” play a role in the above-mentioned texts and in the wider work of some of the authors identified, sovereignty—as a formative construction—remains undertheorised.54

The Unfinished Revolution grapples, cautiously, with race and sovereignty. It builds upon the scholarly openings provided by many of the above texts and projects, even as it amasses and assesses a new archive of nineteenthcentury and later materials that gesture toward the challenges, performances and articulations of nation-ness that contributed to (and may continue to shape) Haiti’s black sovereignty. Although focused primarily on the long nineteenth century, The Unfinished Revolution does venture into later periods in order to illuminate the continued significance of Haiti’s unfinished sovereign revolution to its current international battles—including those that focus on economic, political or cultural issues. As opposed to being a text about the past, I have been urged, by the material, to recognise that these are ongoing struggles and configurations that remain ever present in political dramas facing Haiti, today. I do not aim in these temporal moves to capture every manifestation of continued resistance or battles. What emerges are instances of forward shifts in the narrative that speak directly to particular instances, tropes or figurations that make clear that the unfinished nature of Haiti’s sovereignty will not be miraculously solved by some future form of political recognition. In weaving through time, I reconstruct the ways that these promises in the past have been laid out before—and have not come to fruition. Time here is not a panacea to political dispossession and challenge. In fact, what bubbles forth from the archive are the many spirals of form, thought and resistance that move through and against the unfinished project of black sovereignty.55

In what immediately follows, I offer up an expanded discussion of black sovereignty that makes clear the contours of the term, as articulated within these pages, and its use and relevancy as a framing device. In order to define the limits and potentials of this term, I first explore blackness in relation to sovereignty before tackling the exciting (yet, racially limited) field/debates within sovereignty studies. This discussion is finally followed by a detailed description of the chapters and themes contained within the text.

Black is a Country: The Blackness of Black Sovereignty

Although I use the term black sovereignty throughout the book, I do not deploy it lightly or use it without some trepidation. I recognise the vexed and problematic nature of reducing the complexities of sovereign power and the performances of it on the global stage into an amorphous (even as it may be generative and politically cohering), socially constructed racial category of distinction. For decades, critics have argued that blackness is “slippery,” often defying definition and eluding formal identification. As a result, it is often described as a signifying trope; a dynamic, conscious way of living; a forced conceptualisation; a mobilising idea; a social movement; a political demand; a creative impulse and (importantly) a socially constructed term that means (meant) none of the above.56 The field of black studies is enormous and constantly being reshaped by scholars around the globe who find within its generative space new forms of relationality and contestation. The deftness and nuance of performance artist and black queer theorist E. P atrick Johnson’s work perhaps best captures the vitality (and interdisciplinarity) of critical approaches to the study of blackness. As Johnson notes in Appropriating Blackness: Performance and the Politics of Authenticity, “‘black’ culture” contains a “production of blackness” that involves a “mutual constructing/deconstructing, avowing/disavowing, and expanding/ delimiting dynamic.”57 In essence, it is a complex and charged figuration.

Of course, we know that any assertions about blackness’s essential qualities must be questioned. As scholars have argued for many decades within African diaspora studies, terms such as “black” may hold some set ideas and historical constructions even as they mutate others once black and blackness become global and situated within specific spaces and wielded by specific actors to describe specific entities—whether people, places or things. Deployed in different settings and at different times, these labels may enable, as well as constrain, certain conclusions about the performance of difference—and who can be configured within its sphere. As anyone who studies racialisation and racialisms in a global perspective knows, what constitutes hierarchies of being in one location does not have to be regarded the same way in another.58 New forms of difference, even when marked against the same body, may enable someone never to see race in their daily lives or be marked as different by others primarily through frameworks informed by that body’s immediate location. (Here I am thinking about friends from areas such as Bahia, in north-eastern Brazil, who see themselves one way and then travel to the USA or the United Kingdom and are marked differently by a new system of racialisation or difference.)

As we seek out ways to investigate the transnational vectors and cultural networks that mobilise blackness and the flows of blackness in particular ways, we must also develop methods that allow us to understand how specific political systems and institutions racialise, erase or even re-racialise specific bodies for political purposes. “Black” as a demarcation of a political body/nation, may operate in a similar manner. There is still more research needed in order fully to comprehend the ways that race and nation politically intersect at the international level and impact governance structures and relations between particular nation-states—especially nations such as Haiti, Abyssinia and Liberia—whose nineteenth-century exceptionalism marked them as different. Essayist and novelist Teju Cole makes clear the dilemma about the admiration (ostensibly on the part of white Americans and Europeans) of black exceptions: “In the presence of the admirable, some are breathless not with admiration but with rage. They object to the presence of the black body (an unarmed boy in a street, a man buying a toy, a dancer on the subway, a bystander) as much as they object to the presence of the black mind.” Cole frames these objections in ways similar to Trouillot’s silences, but notes something far more damning about the negation: it profits from “black labor and black innovation,” or what Cole describes as the “co-option of black life.”59 Although this refrain is not the main impetus for this book, there is an echo of it within the history of enforced labour, co-opted lands or meandering credit and inflated geopoliticking in the region. While some nations may have disavowed Haiti, still others courted the nation for its resources—be those people or material things.

Rather than an exercise in arguing for Haiti’s legitimacy within histories of dispossession, this book situates Haiti’s unfinished revolution as an ongoing project that continually produces, even as it recasts, black political thought and nation-state action. It takes the form of a standard academic monograph, but this final product sits uneasily in this form. This discomfiture is a testimony less to the prematurity of the investigation than the contrapuntal aspects of the terms of discovery, the slipperiness of statecraft and the difficulties in finding a point of origin.

In writing this text, I found myself immersed in what critical race theorist and cultural theorist Jared Sexton describes, in his musings on the political geography of black lives, as moments thinking “about the unspeakable, perhaps unimaginable ways that black lives have been devalued,” where you—as the crafter of this tale—“have trouble determining when to start the story—or history or mythology or fable—or how far afield to draw your sphere of concern.”60 This uncertainty adequately captures the dilemma of imagining and articulating Haiti’s black sovereignty as it has emerged within a consistently demeaning and delimiting political world quite often fuelled by racialisms and determinants of political impossibility for those of African descent. Balancing this searching for with a critique of the failings of the frames of race and international relations is a difficult—some would even argue impossible—task.

Yet, this work is more than just an act of recovery regarding Haiti’s political struggle. It is also a search for a framework that corresponds, in many ways, with writer, filmmaker and cultural critic Frank B. Wilderson III ’s call for a “conceptual framework, predicated not on the subject-effect of cultural performance but on the structure of political ontology, a framework that allows us to substitute a culture of politics for a politics of culture.”61 In order to recognise this framework, we—scholars, activists, critics and casual observers alike—must attune our instruments of knowing (spirit, critical thinking, rhythms, etc.) in order to bear witness to the power of black sovereignty and the stultifying aspects of negrophobia/black nullification that exist within transnational sovereignty’s roots and make the ontological struggle of black sovereignty so compelling. Forcing sovereignty to grapple with blackness offers up the chance to study black sovereignty’s many modes and practices: its power, and, to borrow from poet and cultural critic Fred Moten, its “thingliness, even as (absolute) nothingness, even as imprisonment in passage on the most open road of all, even as—to use and abuse a terribly beautiful phrase of [Frank] Wilderson’s (2010: ix)—fantasy in the hold.”62

Back in Haiti, though, blackness has had a long and contentious history as a demarcation of citizenship, an African ancestral-spiritual connector and as part of a movement (and a weapon in the hands of politicians such as François “Papa Doc” Duvalier) of power along class and colour lines—pivoting Haiti, at times, culturally between France and Africa. Cultural critic and critical legal scholar Colin Dayan notes how Haiti, “called variously ‘Black France’ by one nineteenth-century observer” and “a tropical dog-kennel and pestiferous jungle” by another, has always been “moved uneasily between the extremes of [black] idealization and [black] debasement.”63 Dayan continues by noting, “the business of being Haitian [as in the nation-state] was more complex” than these simple categories express.64

Dayan’s observations nod to the entangled racialisation and colourisation that divided Haiti in its colonial form in the eighteenth century. It also firmly rejects philosopher and historian Ernest Renan’s infamous suggestion that race matters only to historians interested in humanity and “has no applications, however, in politics.”65 Blackness mattered so much to Haiti’s revolutionary leaders that the very first constitution of the young nation declared that all Haitian citizens would be marked/coded as “black,” regardless of their previously applied, chosen or assumed racial category. While Haiti’s new leaders chose a name for the nation that forever linked it to its indigenous past (as “Ayiti” is a Taíno word that means mountainous land), they constitutionally cast their citizens as universally black, or what Doris Garraway describes as a “negative universalism.”66 These black citizens, even with their internal divisions in terms of status and wealth, charged into the Atlantic world and challenged—with their very presence and continued existence—that black people, , even those deemed inhuman and unpolitical by others have the right to sovereignty. This book assembles a rich and unexamined archive of power and political practice that provides the contours and evidence of political theorist Siba Grovogui’s claim that “sovereignty takes form through multiple, complex, and differentiated institutions that congeal into formal and informal regimes of authority and practices” that look vastly different when coded black or seen through the lens of race.67 As tempting as it might be to offer a list of patterns or definitive tropes, I have moved to resist the comfiture of the all-knowing intellectual. As a journey, what appears here is less the final word than an opening into a political terrain of discovery. There is, therefore, much to learn.

These racialised differences often erupted into challenges by foreign others to Haiti’s sovereignty that tended to carry within them certain thinly veiled racisms. The encounters often appeared within diplomatic and international circles, especially as nation-states discussed, negotiated, crafted or figured Haiti into their plans. Although external agents often played key roles in the narrativisation of Haiti as black and “other” in these encounters, Haitian politicians and their intermediaries did not sit by as silent actors in their own national/international dramatic story. Instead, many would insist on manipulating, curating, challenging or even assisting the terms used and the assumptions made during these negotiations—for their own political benefit and not necessarily those of the nation’s citizens. Recovering these narratives is important, but so too is understanding how this state-crafting has been and continues to be influenced by racial formations and the unfinished project that is Haiti’s revolutionary sovereignty.

The challenges encountered by Haiti’s founding band of agitators, activists, conspirators and freedom fighters still resonate today, as Haiti and its various leaders engage in battles and negotiations with (or, at times, abet) outside financiers, internal power brokers and international “keepers” of the peace over Haiti’s precarious labouring populace and the nation’s resources (including those found amongst its people and within its environment). Sociologist and Caribbeanist Mimi Sheller argues in an important essay on “Haitian Fear” that how and what we discuss about Haiti “will continue to have a significant impact on international relations and racial formations” in Haiti.68 What Sheller sees as Haitian impacts, I see as more Atlantic and global concerns. Motivated, in part, by the racial projects that attempt to categorise and de-limit the political and sovereign work of Haiti and its politicians, this book charts how this state-work would be cast and performed by Haitians.

Although significant things have been done to Haiti by external others, critics must begin to understand the ways that Haitian officials utilised various conduits of power and influence to craft their version of black statehood in the midst of these external pressures and tensions. What emerges from this multi-directional flow of narratives, counter narratives and cultural diplomacy is a dialogue of power brokering that forms a layered and racially charged conversation about politics and sovereignty—and which entities can embody or be recognised, externally, as having or expressing those characteristics. This is more than just a simple discussion about exclusion.

Constitutional law scholar Hent Kalmo and intellectual historian Quentin Skinner assert, in a critique of sovereignty’s purported obsolescence (amongst other topics), that sovereignty remains an important ambiguous term worth exploring for the very reason that in “answering the question as to what sovereignty is,” critics also have to deal with an additional linked question that cannot be separated from the first—namely, “who is thought to be its proper bearer.”69

Much of the recent political and development aid rhetoric regarding Haiti’s “failed state” status hinges on the premise that Haiti bears no resemblance to a functioning sovereign state. Although some critics point to various causes for Haiti’s perceived failures—such as foreign intervention, unequal power, corruption or political instability—this book asserts that any list of Haiti’s perceived “problems” must include the challenges and manipulations amongst international bodies and nation-states over Haiti’s sovereign existence. This is, as described above, an unfinished issue.

There are important reasons for revisiting Haiti’s unfinished sovereign revolution and its sovereign practices. One, the arrival of the new nation of Haiti in the Atlantic world brought with it sweeping political changes— especially regarding the ideation of freedom, liberty and power—and who had the rights to have, demand and exhibit any of these conditions. This demand, startling and ground-breaking in the nineteenth century, shook the foundations of difference, possession, rights-taking and capital accumulation that many European empires relied upon to build their colonial machines. The arrival of Haiti, and its revolutionary beginnings, would have profound impacts on later rebellions, uprisings, power demands and even national movements across the globe.

While Haiti’s revolution has been celebrated and remains a touchstone for various human rights campaigns because of its embodiment of anti-slavery and anti-colonialism, Haiti’s sovereign arrival—and the impact of its continued political existence—remain unexamined. And we know that its representation mattered and continues to matter in twenty-first-century rhetorics of aid and humanitarianism. Haiti’s name is invoked—especially in coverage in the media—as an anomaly. It may no longer be cast as a savage, violent country, but far too many identify it as a lawless, inept one.70 There is a second important reason to tread into this subject area. Haiti remains a nation caught between the tethers of neoliberalism and planetary sovereignty (although it could be argued that these terms describe similar motivations of control). More has to be done to disentangle these frames of relationality from old and new forms of racialisms (see Chapters 2 and 3 for more on these processes).71 And, finally, Haiti’s particular political situation provides substantive examples of the frames and possibilities of power and resistance for those engaged in global discussions and negotiations about dispossession, rights and environmental impact, such as the many conversations and agitations regarding the future of Kiribati and its people.72

Adding Haiti’s environmental crises into these larger global considerations of contested and racialised zones, such as Nauru, should enable scholars, critics, scientists, community groups, environmentalists and planners to recognise how, as Sheller asserts, “interpretations, representations, and explanations of Haiti continue to serve ongoing ‘efforts to reorganize and redistribute resources along particular racial [or colonial] lines.’”73 What Sheller illuminates and The Unfinished Revolution begins to chart are the ways that these economic and political redistributions and reorganisations hinge on the destabilisation of sovereignty and the currency of racialisation or difference.

In offering up the term “black sovereignty,” I recognise that I have set this text within a vexed area of scholarship regarding the black Atlantic, black politics and black nations in which blackness is neither easily nor often clearly defined in relation to territorially bounded political structures and institutions. (Of course, the same could be said for sovereignty and nationness, but let’s work through one theoretical battle at a time.) Although I have briefly argued above why Haiti’s sovereignty could be coded black, the question remains what is symbolised either about race or politics with or perhaps through this articulation. When we—as critics—configure blackness in association with political bodies, such as nation-states, public bodies or communities, does it describe shared experiences (such as Atlantic racial slavery or cultural connections to Africa); certain political imaginings and resistances (such as those espoused by Négritude, the African Blood Brotherhood or the Black Panthers); or is it merely the recognition of a majority or a minority population within a bounded territory (such as the “race” of the main population of Jamaica or the racio-cultural place-coding implied in the term “black America”)? These questions are not just about numbers, majority or minority status, political ties and cultural memory. What people are called, how they organise themselves through or against these designations, and the ways that other groups recognise or categorise them influences how they may mobilise or construct themselves—and how others may frame their existence.

From a political standpoint, these categorisations and recognitions may carry even greater weight during intergovernmental encounters, delimiting, constraining or even opening certain pathways and articulations of rights, freedoms and liberation strategies during various sensitive debates, negotiations and diplomatic encounters. Black may not be a country, but, for those who experience life as an “outsider” within, it may be the closest thing to a coherency that they have, even as the connective potential of “blackness” gets reshaped by some political agents as a weapon of control or difference.74

As suggested above, identifying a nation as a black nation-state may productively trouble the ways that populations utilise racial codes of distinction (such as the vexed role of “colour” in Haiti, more broadly) and the ways that racialised codes of aggregation may be utilised by internal and external others for political purposes. An example? When pundits in the USA talk about “black America” are they cohering a range of perspectives, people, experiences and ideas into something that is aligned with, but yet separate from, the generic USA? Does “black America” identify a cultural group only lightly and tangentially affiliated with the political entity that is “America”? Or does “black America” signal some entity or thing that manages to live in the land and within the imagination, as a lived theory that can buffer the struggles of existence facing many people of African descent in the USA? On a more personal point: what happens when a black American who identifies as female lives and works in the United Kingdom and encounters diversity information that labels her as black “Other”? In other words: what is blackness and what does it do to political entities, territories and bodies (in the collective sense) as they move and encounter new forms of legal entanglements and political challenges?

Returning to Haiti with these questions illuminates additional tensions. What are the dangers in investigating black sovereignty as a strategy of international power in a country where colourism politics have divided governmental bodies and citizens since its beginnings—reaching its most tragic juxtapositioning in the twentieth century’s “noirisme” movement and the rise and destructive power of François Duvalier?75

While these and similar questions push at the structure and foundations of this book, and keep me up most nights, they are not this book’s main focus. I raise these issues mostly to do battle with my own thoughts on race and national and international politics and openly to place on the table the difficult issues that trouble this research—even as I work to tackle them. As I grapple with “states” of blackness—in a political and global sense—I remain convinced that just as we need new narratives of Haiti and other self-avowed and internationally marked black nation-states we also need new frames of articulation that allow us to understand racialisms and politics even as we seek ways to redraw power within and outside of international systems of governance. These redrawings have taken on significant urgency as notable areas, such as the USA, the United Kingdom, France and Germany, confront shifting forms of racism (and fascism) within their political structures.76 These are elusive and slippery terms to quantify and capture. Refusing to try and understand black sovereignty, though, is something that we cannot continue to do. Lives, I believe, depend on our bearing witness to its moves and its continued work—positively and negatively—in shaping Haiti’s and other black nation-states’ futures. What I have written above, and what circles these pages, are difficult and contentious issues that have attracted political philosophers, activists and theorists to work through and on them.77 The reasons people turn to them are the very reasons that I have placed them for us to consider in this introduction: they impact on the “black” world and our figurations of it. As a singular body of work, this text does not aim to solve the problem of blackness within nation-state sovereignty but to highlight that it actually is a problem worth discussing. Although political theorists, such as Siba Grovogui, have written about blackness, race and sovereignty, much of the discussion on sovereignty and quasi-sovereignty focuses on indigenous sovereignty or the tumultuous mid-twentieth-century movements for decolonisation that reverberated around portions of what is often referred to as the Global South—movements that articulated a vastly different version of the “rising tide of color” that Lothrop Stoddard feared in the 1920s.78 Although indebted to Grovogui, and others, for their keen twentieth-century observations, this book places sovereignty and blackness into historical context by examining a challenge to sovereignty rooted much further back in time than the decolonisation movements of the twentieth century and grounded by figurations of race.79

The Unfinished Revolution, then, works consciously, to situate these processes within international relations, the performances of power and global politics. Even as it examines these considerations and gathers a heretofore unexplored and untheorised set of material objects associated with them, it remains committed to ensuring that additional work adds to this dialogue. And it is a dialogic exchange that is envisioned here as these objects speak to and from the times and situations that gave them meaning. The archive assembled for this project makes clear the precariousness of power as performed by particular racialised and politicised bodies—and the responses by multiple players to this precarity. It asks questions about the forms of this performance, its tropic dimensions and its responses (and adaptations) to the shifting dynamics of blackness and power in the nineteenth-century Atlantic world, even as it charts Haitian leaders’ and their representatives’ demands for reciprocity, sovereign equality and recognition from other sovereign entities. These demands, occurring in divergent circumstances and situations, such as private letters, diplomatic cables or cultural products, circulated through established capitalist flows of knowledge throughout the Atlantic world, drew together competing and, oftentimes, compelling figurations of black sovereignty and empire.

National leaders on both sides of the Atlantic Ocean struggled to recognise Haiti as an equal nation-state throughout the nineteenth century, especially one capable of engaging in sovereign decision-making. But this refusal and declared disavowal is only part of the story.80 Sources from the assembled archive within this volume amply demonstrate that many of the agents who refused politically to recognise Haiti encouraged—either directly or through various economic agents—commercial and military entanglements with Haiti. Although some media and political agents were quick to label Haiti’s entire machinery of state power as the “best burlesque” the world had ever seen, others sought ways to harness Haiti’s resources or direct its capital. And Haitian officials often fed off or even manipulated this “hunger” for their own means. Meanwhile, public discourses on both sides of the Atlantic grappled with how best to describe and deal with Haiti, the political entity.

US newspaper accounts from around the mid-nineteenth century routinely portray Haiti as a political absurdity.81 As a nation, Haiti was dubbed the Atlantic world’s foolish parody. Its monarchs, emperors and presidents represented the punchline of comical dark jokes—as if shades of colour and politics could never mix. Haiti’s attempts at engaging in statecraft were often mocked and its leaders recast in sketches as simian-like creatures ridiculously attempting to engage in politics. Critics have produced a body of literature that charts these caricatures and isolation—especially as they relate to the early years of Haiti’s existence.82 This text dives into this archive and begins to ask what Haiti’s black sovereignty is and how have the battles to be/ remain sovereign responded to racialisms and racisms within the sectors of politics and international relations. In considering this history, the text places these older battles for sovereignty within current transnational and extragovernmental initiatives and projects aimed at Haiti’s current economic and political future. The next section lays out some of the stakes of these battles for authority within sovereignty before turning to an overview of the book’s chapters.

Sovereignty without Power: The Role of Race in the Battle for Authority

As a text about Haiti and its articulation, construction and performance of sovereign power in the nineteenth century, The Unfinished Revolution does not simply argue that Haiti has been on the receiving end of ostracisation since its inception. Although non-recognition (at different times and within different contexts) from France, the United Kingdom and the USA carried with it significant penalties for Haiti, Haitian politicians, their official and unofficial designees and cultural representatives routinely staged oppositional performances of empowerment. By refusing politically to engage with Haiti, various international political actors (such as US President Thomas Jefferson, who was in office from 1801 to 1809) consciously deployed strategies of disengagement, or perhaps controlled engagement, that framed exchanges with Haitian officials and their intermediaries as variations of “not”—not politics, not recognition, not reciprocity and definitely not transnational exchanges as equal sovereign nations. In framing these diplomatic and quasi-diplomatic conversations and entanglements around “nots,” Jefferson and others stressed that they did not see people of African descent as beings capable of articulating, crafting or practising politics.83 Although many of these politicos rejected or outwardly struggled with the radical antislavery potential of the Haitian Revolution (and its violence), they also refused to assign political power to any entity—including nations—coded as black. The Haitian Revolution may have inspired fantasies and fuelled nightmares of a contagion of slave upheavals, but it also stirred up deep chasms between abstract notions and articulations of freedom and the type of people who had the right to claim those ideas for themselves on an individual, collective and nation-state level.

Political theorist Siba Grovogui traces some of this history, its impact on international relations and the role of sovereignty within these processes. In an important chapter discussing these issues, Grovogui examines the impact of the American, French and Haitian Revolutions on sovereignty’s contemporary construction. He concludes that “centuries before the modern Refugee Convention, the Helsinki Accords, and the philosophical treatises of Giorgio Agamben and Hannah Arendt, Haitian slaves had pondered bare existence and the right to those so reduced to such an existence to claim sovereign rights for themselves.” These rights-claimers, Grovogui continues, demanded in their continued national existence that people of African descent, including formerly enslaved persons, had “equal access to the resources of life” and power.84

Grovogui’s theoretical moves, above, suggest the tensions that exist within sovereignty studies between articulations about who has access to (or controls) the so-called “resources of life,” how power moves between the entities connected within sovereignty’s web and who ultimately wields sovereign authority. Political geographer John Agnew occupies a specific role within these debates. Rather than arguing the case for sovereignty’s elusiveness or its irrelevancy in our hyper-global world, Agnew takes aim at the artificial aspects of its supposed spatial demarcations. In other words, sovereignty can extend beyond state and territorial borders due to the networks that power uses to travel or the multiple outside entities that a sovereign state has to encounter. Agnew does not reject the state as superfluous. Instead, he reimagines state power as deterritorialised, setting his theories in opposition to critics who argue for either the centrality of globalisation (see sociologist Sassia Sassken for more on this) or the impact of liquid modernity upon the transnational circuits of power that fuel “extraction zones” and repeated cycles of dispossession.85

What Agnew stresses is the geography of sovereignty—and its unequal moves. In recognising the disparateness in which sovereignty can tether legitimacy to the wielding of state violence in the name of “defending the state,” Agnew draws attention to the ways in which sovereign claims or the practice of acting as a sovereign sets up a relational field in which only designated sets of actors are able to engage within certain political projects. This is a powerful situational field of engagement and disavowal that has significant domestic and international implications. As Agnew states, “claims to sovereignty provide the linguistic coin in which both domestic and international politics are transacted.”86 Although Agnew’s case studies are read through the lens of deterritorialisation and not race (in counterdistinction to my reading of black sovereignty), we nevertheless share a conviction that “sovereignty is made out of the circulation of power among a range of actors at dispersed sites rather than simply emanating outward from an original and commanding central point.”87 Agnew takes aim at the abstracted state, but his evaluations of sovereign practice involve little consideration of “race matters” within these processes.

The same is true of other international relations scholars who mostly resist discussing race. The potential importance of race to sovereignty lies just beneath the surface in many of these discussions. Take, for example, the work of international relations scholar Jens Bartelson, who, in writing about the indivisibility of sovereignty and its “symbolic form,” takes the reader through a historical reconceptualisation of early theorists of sovereignty—namely, Hobbes, Bodin and Grotius—while noting that even as scholars grapple with definitions of sovereignty and its legal and potentially extraterritorial contours, “sovereignty cannot simply be wished away, since it has been foundational to the differentiation of modern political life into a domestic and an international space.”88 If race and difference have played roles in domestic, military and imperial expansions, so too must they dance along the contours of sovereign articulations. We must not ignore sovereignty’s origins, its mutations over time as certain nation states have been absorbed within it—or distinguished as different—or the implications of these distinctions for exceptional nation-states. For the purposes of this book, it is clear that sovereignty’s nation-state beginnings do not include political bodies that represent people of African descent. By default, race must play a key role, as political entities demarcated as non-white would have been denied sovereign recognition at their conception.

Scholars such as Kevin Bruyneel have written extensively about indigenous or tribal sovereignty, especially as it relates to indigenous and aboriginal communities and First Nation peoples within North America, South America, Africa and the Pacific. Alongside work by Grovogui, these examinations within sovereignty studies have critiqued the limitations of tribal or quasi-sovereignty, including those within decolonised and paracolonial spaces still economically or politically tied (some would say controlled) by former imperial powers. These two strands of scholarship are extensive and growing and help support much of the considerations of race that inform my readings of sovereignty. Rather than read black sovereignty through a more Agambian notion of “bare life,” I read black sovereignty through the critical lens of blackness. This is not a sovereignty given meaning by enslavement, violence or the control of life, but a sovereignty given meaning through political struggle.

#### Blackness should be connected to the loss of sovereignty and statehood. The political history of African state destruction is erased by the paradigm of blackness in opposition to this world. Their paradigm naturalizes a liberal autonomous subject by treating blackness as a socio-cultural confrontation between slave and master. Affirmative struggle for self-expression replaces the political power of self-determination.

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Another way to approach the issue of a transformation is to focus on how contemporary theorists conceive of slavery. Clearly, a modern sensibility governs representations of early modern slavery, whereby the institution largely figures as an economic trope. The slave appears as an abject subject under dominion of the master but now untethered from the oikos, which characterized the ancient and medieval world 's instantiation of slavery. In place of dominion-which linked the slave and slavery to politics-the market and difference govern the institution. Through this prism, slavery no longer operated under the earlier formulation of power whose genealogy was traceable to the ancient world. For this reason, when theorists reference the slave, they depict modern relations in which both the master and the slave struggle for affirmation as liberal (individual) subjects. This very (modern) subjectivity informs the sociologist and social theorist Orlando Patterson's description of the slave. Indeed, Patterson's depiction already embodies the subjectivity of an individual on whom violence was continually enacted. In this respect, Patterson-despite his emphasis on enslavement as an act of natal alienation configured the slave as an Enlightenment subject-the individual-while also implicating the master-slave dialect in a drama cast and staged by the Enlightenment: beings conceiving of themselves, their autonomy, and freedom in terms that always already assumed a form rooted in the temporality associated with the Enlightenment. This obviously represents an ahistorical representation, which has accompanied our general embrace of Patterson's social death formulation. This realization may surprise-though curiously has attracted little attention-given that Patterson is also the scholar who long ago claimed that we needed to historicize our representations of slavery and freedom. Contrary to his insistence that we delineate the process of making chattel, Patterson's historicizing does not extend to the Enlightenment temporality that the slave inhabits. Since a subjectivity rooted in the late eighteenth century could not have served as the antithesis of the very categories engendered by the Enlightenment, which includes natal alienation, I would argue that the dynamic of making a slave in the early modern period demands a distinct history and still requires a theorization. In lieu of such a distinct historical logic with its accompanying social forms, the dispossessed, uprooted, and alienated individual-forged in the eighteenth century-remains the universal subject of the slave past. At its core, the project at hand points to an unacknowledged and unwritten history in which the subject, the individual, is seen as a process that involves uprooting persons from the only form of sociality, the polis however conceived-and thereby attending to how the making of a slave as the progenitor of the modern individual entails an engagement with a more nuanced story of power with which former selves were associated. To excavate this long-neglected history demands configuring slavery in relationship to sovereign power. Until such time, we will not have a complicated history of power in the framing of the African past and in the early modern African diaspora: such histories are of critical importance in narrating the story of power. For this reason, I have insisted on bringing sovereign power into our discussion of the African-European encounter and the history of the African diaspora, and also to suggest that this history of the state, as one instantiation of sovereign power, represents a foundational framing for understanding how the individual (but also the ethnic and the cultural) emerges. Here it might be useful to recall my earlier claim: the African diaspora has moved away from its conceptualization rooted in state destruction-an act whereby an external or imperial assault-destroys the polity of another people, thus rendering them stateless beings. The African diaspora, in turn, has become an analytical framing that varies on a continuum of shared consciousness, culture, and racial ancestry, while the state remains noticeably absent. Stated differently, slavery once figured prominently in the discourse on power, yet in its recent history, early modern political theorists conceived of slavery as an economic system and a means for coercing labor, thereby reducing its more complicated relationship to power; even Hegel who repositions the master-slave dialectic back into the realm of power does so around the modern abstraction of the individual embodied in the slave and the master. Early modern theorists and travelers, however, were not in a position to conceive of autonomous individuals and seemed not to have lost sight of the relationship between trade and sovereignty.

#### Tracing the world-making power of self-determination builds solidarity in the face of environmental injustice, global hierarchy, and exploitation.

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Getachew’s (2019: 2) book holds that while decolonization is seen as a moment of ‘nation-building [. . .] and the formation of nation-states’, instead, we ought to see anticolonial nationalism itself as an exercise in ‘worldmaking’. In other words, Getachew recasts anticolonial nationalism itself as a transnational process, seeking an equitable remaking of the world to overcome the injustices of colonialism and neo-colonialism. Getachew’s (2019: 5) book thus signals a gestalt shift in the way that she envisages anticolonial nationalism not as ‘marking the collapse of internationalism and the closure of alternative conceptions of a world after empire’, but instead as a direct, transnational confrontation to ‘the legacies of imperial hierarchy with a demand for the radical reconstitution of the international order’.

Through focusing explicitly on Nnamdi Azikiwe, W.E.B. Du Bois, Michael Manley, Kwame Nkrumah, Julius Nyerere, George Padmore, and Eric Williams, Getachew focuses on three forms of anticolonial worldmaking. Firstly, Getachew explores the anticolonial demand for the right to selfdetermination. Central to Getachew’s (2019: 75) argument is that anticolonial nationalists did not simply ‘take up’ the West’s discourse of self-determination and use it to secure their own independence, but – similarly to how Gopal (2019) looks at anticolonial iterations of liberty, freedom, and justice – through an ‘anticolonial appropriation’ such nationalists radically reconceptualised the meaning of self-determination. Thus, as it was first articulated by the League of Nations, self-determination involved ‘the consent of the governed and consultation with subject people’; however, this definition still allowed for colonialism given that ‘racially backwards people’ were said to not yet be capable of self-governance (Getachew, 2019: 42). Years after the League of Nations, the United Nations (UN) Charter of 1945 again evoked ‘human rights and equality of nations [. . .] as founding principles of a new world order’ despite the continuity of colonial rule (Getachew, 2019: 71). By contrast, anticolonial radicals – through forming organisations and conferences such as the League against Imperialism, and the Pan-African Congresses – directly highlighted the hypocrisy of the Westernized definition of self-determination. For instance, Nkrumah and Padmore organised the fifth Pan-African Congress in Manchester, 1945, where the epistemic roots were planted for self-determination to be reconceptualised as a universalist issue of human rights. Through showing how colonialism itself was a violation of human rights, the work of anticolonial nationalists radically shifted the discourse of selfdetermination such that by 1960, when Nkrumah spoke to the UN as the president of Ghana, he was able to use the principle of self-determination to show how colonialism was directly against the UN’s principles, thus leading to the Article 1514 Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Peoples and Countries.

Secondly, Getachew looks at anticolonial nationalist worldmaking through focusing on the formation of regional federations. As Getachew (2019: 113) shows, to such anticolonial nationalists, sovereignty granted through the right to self-determination was ‘meaningless in the context of international hierarchy and economic dependence’. This relates to Nkrumah’s critique of neo-imperialism, described as ‘the disjuncture between formal independence and de facto dependence’ (Getachew, 2019: 108), whereby nation states have ‘nominal freedom’ yet remain economically dependent on the Global North and thus vulnerable to political domination through financial control. In response to this neo-imperialism, radicals like Nkrumah and Eric Williams saw federations – such as the Union of African States or the West Indian Federation – as providing the potential for economic trade and development that did not require foreign intervention and reliance on the Global North. This is why, for instance, upon Ghana becoming a republic in 1960, Nkrumah’s nationalism also involved successfully advocating for a clause in the constitution that conferred on the parliament ‘the power to provide for the surrender of the whole or any part of the sovereignty of Ghana’ once a Union of African States was formed (Getachew, 2019: 107): national independence was thus connected to an embracing of anticolonial internationalism.

Connected to such building of federations, which ultimately failed, Getachew explores the final form of anticolonial nationalist worldmaking: the demand for a New International Economic Order (NIEO). Getachew thus shows how ‘second wave’ anticolonial nationalists, such as Michael Manley and Julius Nyerere, developed Nkrumah’s critique of neo-imperialism to show how formerly colonized nations were still vulnerable and exploited in an unequal global political economy – if not by other nations, then by private corporations. This meant that not only were the newly independent nations unequally integrated into the world economic system, but that their efforts of state building were also much more susceptible to the fluctuations of the international markets and private, corporate interests. Thus emerged the demands for a New International Economic Order (NIEO). The Declaration for the Establishment of an NIEO, put to the UN in 1974, challenged the way that the UN’s General Assembly – where each member has one vote – has the power to issue legally binding international economic policy. Anticolonial nationalists, such as Nyerere, pointed out that such formal, legislative equality that was granted to formerly colonized nations was not translated into a substantive equality – as Getachew (2019: 93) summaries: ‘to say that Jamaica or Tanzania and the United States were equal members of the international order obfuscated the outsized economic dominance that the United States exercised and could deploy to compel dependent states’. Thus, Nyerere argued that an NIEO was needed such that newly independent states could have the freedom to pursue their own economic programmes, including the ability to nationalize industries under private control. To such nationalists, this NIEO was in fact a necessary prerequisite to achieve the UN’s founding principle for international order: that of sovereign equality. In other words, anticolonial radicals used the principle of national sovereignty, and economic control over one’s own nation, again as a process through which we could achieve an anti-imperial world order.

At the heart of Getachew’s (2019: 2) book, therefore, is the principle that ‘decolonization was a project of reordering the world that sought to create a domination free and egalitarian international order’. Anticolonial nationalism, read through this lens, despite evoking principles of self-determination and national sovereignty, was always concerned with the grander transnational project of remaking the world in an equitable fashion.

Stretching the sociology of race across time and space

While my review of these three books’ arguments is fairly brief, I hope it is already apparent that despite making discrete arguments and contributions, they each share some fundamental similarities. Throughout the books, we see recurrent figures mentioned – from Du Bois, Padmore and Nkrumah, through to Gandhi, Churchill, and Woodrow Wilson – as well as analysis of key institutions and conferences – from the Gadar Party, based on the West Coast of the United States campaigning for Indian anti-colonialism, through to the League against Imperialism and the Pan-African Congresses. I want to now develop this review by focusing on three particular ways that these three books’ transnational and historical scopes push forward the sociology of race.

Racism at home, imperialism abroad

Firstly, each of these three books makes the point that there is an inherent connection between racism ‘at home’ in the West, with Western practices of colonialism, imperialism, and neo-colonialism ‘abroad’. Desai’s (2020) discussion, for instance, interrogates how Du Bois saw racialised capitalism as the binding factor between the United States’ exploitation of Black Americans with the British empire’s colonial apparatus, and how ‘whiteness’ offered a symbolic space of purity – a material and psychological wage – that impeded the white workers across the West to endorse an anti-imperialism. In his critique of racial capitalism, therefore, Du Bois argues that ‘the English working classes are exploiting India [. . .] and the working classes of America are subjugating Santo Domingo and Haiti [. . .] He is a co-worker in the miserable modern subjugation of over half the world’ (quoted in Desai 2020: 144). Similarly, Gopal (2019: 284) questions: ‘How could the problem of race in the context of global imperialism be addressed in its specificity and as it intersected with the question of class and the exploitation of labour?’ In exploring this question through the lens of dissent against the British empire, Gopal (2019: 441) presents the work of anticolonial Marxists – such as C. L.R James, Padmore, and Eric Williams – each of whom stressed that ‘if empire was to be left behind, then the buccaneering capitalism that it had propagated would also need to be replaced with a more radically egalitarian system’. In advocating for a new ‘radically egalitarian’ alternative to global capitalism, these radicals sought to not just free those newly independent nations from the Global North’s economic control, but also those ‘postcolonial citizens’ exploited in the metropoles itself. Lastly, Getachew (2019: 20–21) discusses the notion of a ‘global Jim Crow’, highlighting how rather than being an idiosyncrasy of the US South, ‘the color line was an international phenomenon of which segregation and racial domination in the United States were only a domestic iteration’.

Indeed, it may seem almost too obvious of a point to make that racism is connected to the processes of colonialism and neo-colonialism. After all, ‘the concept of race was thus the glue that stuck the colonial world order together, as it became common-sense knowledge that there was a global racial hierarchy which permitted the colonization of the “lesser” races by the dominant white Europeans’ (Meghji, 2020a: 4). Nevertheless, if we look at dominant approaches in the sociology of race, then such transnational connections tend to be elided. Instead, much sociology of race tends to be characterised by a methodological nationalism in which it becomes sociologically viable – and advisable – to study racism within the confines of particular, discrete nation states (Meghji, Forthcoming). However, such methodological nationalism is not analytically useful for our current predicaments. It is the same social system that exploits the labour of children in China to make electronic goods, that exploits the (disproportionately Black and Brown) zero-hour contracted truck driver who delivers this product to its eventual owner in the West; it is the same imperialised-racialised principle that Islam is opposed to modernity that justifies the state surveillance of Muslims under the Patriot Act in the United States and the Prevent counter-terrorism programme in Britain, that justifies Western military intervention in the Middle East under the guise of civilizing the backwards world. While neither Getachew, Desai, or Gopal’s books are explicitly about the links between racism and imperialism, they each highlight that there is a radical tradition of thought which has always analysed these two processes in tandem with one another. The fact that this tradition already exists pushes me to my next point, as I argue that the sociology of race needs to adopt a more historical approach.

Looking backwards to move forwards

While each of the three reviewed books use historical methods, each of them also reflects on our present conjunctures. Getachew (2019: 181) points out that the ‘worldmakers of decolonization’ offer an intellectual tradition through which to think about contemporary transnational movements such as ‘the Movement for Black Lives, the Caribbean demand for reparations for slavery and genocide, and South African calls for a social and economic decolonization’. Similarly, Gopal (2019: 448) argues the dispelling the myth of British colonial benevolence, and centering anticolonial agency, allows us to both move beyond the idea that Britain is a global superpower that has the legitimacy to intervene across the globe, as well as allowing ‘Britons to lay claim to a different, more challenging history [. . .] which can draw on multiple historical and cultural resources’. Lastly, Desai (2020) argues that his book highlights historical themes that still shape the present day, such as the United States’ claim of being the champion of liberalism and democracy while it still routinely kills many of its citizens (and those around the world).

In short, therefore, each of the three authors stress the necessity of having a historical sensibility to comprehend current situations and social processes. At the very same time as they are developing such temporal linkages, however, we are seeing increased attempts within the sociology of race to bifurcate the study of racism away from its historical roots in colonialism (and consequently, its contemporary basis in neo-colonialism). If we take critical race theory, for instance, Bonilla-Silva (2015: 74) even goes as far as to say that this paradigm ought to move beyond ‘the sins [of the] past (e.g., slavery, colonization, and genocide)’ in studying the ‘contemporary foundation’ of racism. Of course, Bonilla-Silva has apt reasons for his methodological scope – by reducing racism to being a consequence of past events, we lose sight of how racism continues because it still benefits people in the present day, who consequently maintain an interest in reproducing it. Nevertheless, we have to question whether being captured in a methodological ‘presentism’, which explicitly attempts to bifurcate the study of the present from its past, is analytically viable when it comes to the processes of racialisation and racism.

Very often, for instance, what we immediately think of as a social process specific to our present racialised social structure in fact has a much longer history informed by the logics of coloniality. For instance, consider the case of the militarisation of the police in the United States – a key issue in contemporary racism. As Go (2020) shows, such militarisation of the United States’ police started in the early 20th century primarily as a means of punitively surveying and controlling the racially subdominant. However, the tactics used by this police – such as the creation of mobile squads and intelligence divisions – derived from the United States’ military practices in their colonies (Go, 2020). In this regard, Go creates a temporal link between a contemporary issue of police militarisation with its historical origins, and also a transnational link between ‘racism at home’ with the US’ ‘imperialism abroad’ in a way that transcends bifurcated understandings of racialized processes.

Without necessarily having it as their primary focus, therefore, Getachew, Gopal, and Desai each show the possibilities for social analysis that can be opened up if we retain a historical focus when looking at contemporary society. Through appreciating the historical linkages with contemporary racism, we become better placed to connect with the various intellectual paradigms which dedicated themselves to dismantling this system in the fight for social justice. It is this theme of social justice that we now turn to.

Towards anti-racist, anti-colonial solidarities

A recurrent theme runs through each of the reviewed books: the importance of forging transnational solidarities. Gopal (2019) shows how anticolonial radicals in Britain centred solidarity – in the sense of multicultural, transnational, crossorganisational coalitions – in their struggles against the British empire, meaning that thinkers in the metropoles, such as Frederic Harrison and Arthur Ballard, came to argue that the British ruling class’ fascism in the colonies, in the name of capital accumulation, could be connected with their exploitation of white British workers. Similarly, Desai’s (2020: 45) concept of ‘transnational refraction’ was built around the premise that anti-imperialists thought about colonialism and racism through the sense of shared struggle and solidarity, citing, for instance Saint Nihal Singh’s argument that there was a fundamental ‘link between the Asian migrant laborer [in the United States], the African American subject, and the colonized Indian, each connected the other by the sheer fact of being on the wrong side of the color line’. Desai (2020: 199) even concludes his book with the assertion that such transnational refraction is a prerequisite for solidarity, when he comments that: ‘solidarity emerges only out of a wilful act of seeing through the eyes of another, whose life we can only understand in glimpses’. Lastly, Getachew (2019: 145) too notes that anticolonial nationalists ‘fashioned Third World solidarity as a form of international class politics, and demanded redistribution on the basis that postcolonial states had in fact produced the wealth the West enjoyed’.

Each of these authors focuses on transnational, multicultural, multiorganisational forms of solidarity not because it is historically interesting, but because history has shown us that these forms of solidarity are successful and necessary in the struggles for social justice. I make this point not because the sociology of race is wilfully ignoring the importance of such solidarity, but because the issues of racism facing us in the contemporary and future world need to replicate these forms of solidarity fostered by the anticolonial radicals recounted in these three books. When we think of the climate crisis, for instance, a solidarity needs to be forged between the poor workers across the West (many of whom areracialised as Black and Brown) who are disproportionately exposed to air pollution, with the environmental destruction faced by indigenous people across Latin America, Canada, the United States, Australia, and New Zealand in the name of capital accumulation, who also in turn need to form a solidarity with those in South Asia facing starvation due to droughts, who in turn need to form solidarities with those in the Caribbean, Mozambique, and Zimbabwe, where cyclones and hurricanes have been creating humanitarian crises. When we think of Islamophobia, we need to form a solidarity between those campaigning against the punitive surveillance of, and state violence towards, Muslims in the West, with those campaigning against the Uyghur detention camps in China, and the Hindutva violence towards Muslims in Kashmir. When it comes to race and racism, we are always talking about transnational, historically, epistemically, and spatially connected social processes, and – as Getachew rightfully highlights – ‘worldmaking’ processes of inequality require equally global solidarities and projects of resistance.

#### Our alternative – We should adopt the principle of sovereignty as non-domination. Non-domination flips responsibility and accountability against powerful states. The alternative proves the international community has a responsibility to secure the background conditions that end neo-colonialism and indirect hierarchy.

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Toward a Postcolonial Cosmopolitanism

Theorizing from the specificity of the postcolonial condition also offers critical resources in normative debates about sovereignty and the international order. Against the backdrop of self-determination’s fall, political theorists and philosophers reframed their questions about justice and legitimacy from a global perspective. Historically, these disciplines viewed the domestic sphere and particularly the “sovereign state as the consummation of political experience and activity” and thus limited normative theorizing to questions of domestic politics.68 However, beginning in the 1970s and in a more sustained fashion after the end of the Cold War, the global turn in political theory questioned this disaggregation of the domestic and international and subjected the international to normative theorizing. Fueling this body of work was a confrontation with the nation-state’s empirical and normative limits. On the one hand, the stylized self-sufficient state, which served as the backdrop for John Rawls’s A Theory of Justice, appeared entirely out of sync with the growing interdependence wrought by economic globalization. In his early critique of Rawls’s assumptions about self-sufficient states, Charles Beitz drew on the growing role of multinational corporations and transnational capital flows to argue that “international economic cooperation creates a new basis for international morality.”69 For Beitz and the field of global justice that emerged in the wake of this intervention, this account of economic globalization made it possible to theorize redistributive obligations beyond the state.

By the end of the Cold War, the growing layers of international legal, political, and economic interdependence also opened up new possibilities for rethinking the political institutions of the international order. In this context, a “fortress-like conception of state sovereignty,” which historically gave states a monopoly on internal political and economic decision-making, was giving way to international institutions and particularly international human rights law that sought to limit and tame state action.70 According to Habermas, these developments signaled a growing transformation of “international law as a law of states into cosmopolitan law as a law of individuals.”71 In this context, Habermas and others have examined the prospects for a constitutionalization of international law that does not aim at the formation of a world state, but disaggregates sovereignty such that the limited functions of securing peace and protecting human rights are lodged in a supranational institution while intermediary and regional institutions address arenas of growing interdependence such as economic and environmental policy.72

While the field of cosmopolitan political theory includes debates that range from global distributional justice to the constitutionalization of regional and international organizations, a central assumption of this perspective is that we now occupy a post-Westphalian world order. On this view, an international order governed by the principles of state sovereignty, equality, and nonintervention can be dated to the 1648 Treaty of Westphalia and was progressively expanded and extended in the course of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. As noted above, decolonization is often viewed as the culmination of this process. At the same time, this moment of its universalization is said to coincide with economic and political transformations that chipped away at the normative model of the “self-determining sovereign national state.”73 Thus, while decolonization made the Westphalian model universal, it quickly became “an anachronism.”74

This invocation of “Westphalian sovereignty” is often taken to be a conceptual construct rather than a lived reality. But even when this is acknowledged, the division of Westphalian and post-Westphalian elides the continuities between our international past and present by obscuring the ways in which empire was and continues to be constitutive of international society. An expansive view of empire as a practice and structure of unequal integration rather than simply alien rule highlights the deep continuities between the Westphalian and post-Westphalian world orders. For instance, far from being unprecedented, contemporary economic globalization should be situated within a long history of an imperial global economy. The “density, the speed, and the impact of the global flows” that emerged from the first colonial encounters in the Americas were already planetary in the fifteenth century and restructured political and economic relations within and beyond the Atlantic world.75 This economic integration often took the form of a “non-colonial imperialism” that secured economic access and domination through indirect forms of coercion.76 Contemporary conditions—such as the outsized power of private corporations, the role of international institutions in ensuring the unfettered movement of capital, and the inequalities this era of globalization has generated—build on these imperial foundations and reproduce the logics of unequal integration.

And as was the case prior to decolonization, relations of economic dependence and inequality are often coupled with legal and political modes of unequal membership in international society. While decolonization is associated with the extension of formal rights to all states, legal handicaps written into the process of decolonization set limits on the sovereignty of postcolonial states.77 Thus, even at the moment associated with the culmination of Westphalian sovereignty, juridical equality was aspirational rather than fully realized. More recently, international lawyers and scholars of international relations have abandoned even the normative and aspirational commitment to sovereign equality, arguing for a return to modes of conditional and limited membership for states deemed outlaws, failed, or rogue.78 The explicit defense of a hierarchically organized international order coincides with the growing power of institutions like the UN Security Council and the unilateralism of the United States.79 Rather than view the international order through the dichotomy of Westphalian and post-Westphalian, we should understand it as an imperial world order that was challenged by projects of anticolonial worldmaking and was reconstituted.

The persistence of unequal integration and hierarchy calls for a postcolonial cosmopolitanism that recenters the problem of empire. Drawing on the critique of international hierarchy and the anticolonial efforts to build a world after empire, which are reconstructed in the following pages, this model of cosmopolitanism is less aimed at the limits of the nation-state and more concerned with the ways that relations of hierarchy continue to create differentiated modes of sovereignty and reproduce domination in the international sphere. As described above, hierarchy designates not hegemony, but processes of integration and interaction that produce unevenly distributed rights, obligations, and burdens. These processes of unequal integration are structural and embedded in the institutional arrangements of the international order. They create the international conditions of ongoing imperial domination.

With its critical and diagnostic orientation focused on the present configurations of international hierarchy, the normative and utopian core of a postcolonial cosmopolitanism remains the principle of nondomination at the center of anticolonial worldmaking.80 Nondomination recasts the current configurations of international hierarchy as infringements on collective projects of self-government. This approach contrasts with an account of the injustices of the international sphere that is primarily concerned with the violation of individual human rights. While international human rights protections have provided important resources in challenging international hierarchy and can be combined with collective claims for self-government, on their own they offer a limited account of the wrongs involved.81 For instance, the expansive claims of private corporations not only undermine individual human rights but also threaten the capacity of self-government insofar as corporate prerogatives erode guarantees secured through state constitutions and national legislation. An emphasis on nondomination thus broadens our account of the injustices that unequal integration and international hierarchy engender. Moreover, as the examples of anticolonial worldmaking suggest, realizing the international condition of nondomination necessary to self-government can extend beyond a defense of the state to include more demanding internationalisms.

In this dual focus on hierarchy and nondomination, a postcolonial cosmopolitanism offers a more circumspect approach to the antistatist orientation of the cosmopolitan turn in political theory. In championing the equal moral worth of persons against the morally arbitrary nature of nation-states, cosmopolitan theorists have advocated taming the state through international law and have expanded the reach of our political and moral obligations. However, this privileging and prioritization of the moral worth of individuals coincides with the normative diminution of collective claims to sovereignty and self-determination, which have historically served to restrain imperialism. As Jean Cohen has argued, in “prematurely drop[ping] the concept of sovereignty” and “assum[ing] that a constitutional cosmopolitan legal order already exists which has or should replace international law,” cosmopolitans risk “becoming apologists for neo-imperial projects.”82 Viewing sovereignty as primarily an impediment to securing the rights of individuals provides cover for imperial practices cynically masked as humanitarian efforts and leaves insufficient normative resources to distinguish and critique imperial and hierarchical curtailments of sovereignty.

This is not an argument for retreating into a defensive sovereigntist position, which cannot provide adequate critical and normative resources to address the contemporary dilemmas of the international order, and it should be clear that the postcolonial approach outlined here does not offer an exhaustive theory of the international order. But in returning to the problem of empire, it provides a readjustment of what we take to be the central conundrums and predicaments of international politics. Moreover, it reminds us that claims of sovereignty and sovereign equality not only have preserved the state against claims of international justice by creating a hermetic seal but also have served as the foundation of anti-imperial visions of international justice. These principles provide bulwarks against hierarchy and resources for resisting domination in the international sphere, while also making possible ambitious visions of the international redistribution of political and economic power.

### 1NC – GND CP

#### We advocate that the United States federal government adopt the Green New Deal.

#### Green New Deal framework unites policy vision, moral framework, and power analysis to address climate change, racial injustice, and economic deprivation. The racist legacy of environmental injustice proves the need to craft a new vision rather than give in to inevitability of failure.

Rhiana **GUNN-WRIGHT** Climate Policy Director @ Roosevelt Inst. ‘**20** in *Winning the Green New Deal* eds. Prakash & Guido Girgenti p. ecopy not paginated

People often ask me why I decided to help develop the Green New Deal. Why did I, a twentysomething black woman, think I could help develop a policy proposal to address something as big as climate change? Often, I think they expect some grand story: about incredible courage or deep ambition or a master plan for the revolution. The truth is that I was scared—and I really needed a job.t

I grew up, raised by my mother and grandmother, in the same house that my mother grew up in, in a neighborhood on the South Side of Chicago called Englewood. In the thirty years between my grandparents moving in with their three babies and me being born, Englewood had gone from being a (mostly) middle-income community, close-knit and quiet, to one of the poorest, most barren parts of the city. My neighborhood had so many problems: poverty, unemployment, underfunded schools, police brutality, pollution, violence. And those were just the big ones. I rarely saw anyone in power try to solve the problems in Englewood. And when they did try, it seemed to make things worse.

When I asked my mom and grandma why Englewood looked like this, they didn’t tell me about guns or drugs or gangs. They told me about the government. About how the highway system had been built through black neighborhoods, destroying communities that would never be rebuilt. About the public housing authority razing public housing and scattering families in the name of “urban development,” only for city officials to turn around and sell the land to developers on the cheap, now that the projects sat on prime real estate. About the city underfunding black schools and then shutting them down because of “underperformance.” And that’s just what happened to my neighborhood—not even what happened to my family. At the time I’m writing this, I now know that:

My grandmother’s family was not eligible for Social Security for at least fifteen years because her mother was a washerwoman, and the New Deal excluded agricultural and domestic workers (nearly all black at the time) from Social Security—President Roosevelt needed to secure votes from Southern Democrats and Southern Democrats needed cheap labor from economically vulnerable black people.

My grandfather bought our house without any help from the GI Bill, despite being a veteran of the Korean War. My mother told me that he was too proud to apply. The truth is, pride or not, the government denied home loans to black veterans, and the notorious redlining in Chicago meant that he wouldn’t have been approved anyway.

I grew up in a frontline community—meaning that I lived in an area close to a pollution source and with high levels of air pollution. I developed asthma, like most of my friends in my neighborhood. I could barely run until I was in my late teens, and I regularly missed school, which, in turn, meant that my self-employed mother had to miss work. My mother and I had no idea that I was sick because of where we lived. My lungs are weakened to this day.

Progress came with a price, and the price was us. And by the time the Green New Deal came into my life, I would be damned before I paid another dime.

WHAT IS POLICY?

I have spent my life trying to rewrite systems of power, and policy is nothing if not a system for creating and distributing power**.** This is, of course, not how most people think of public policy. In fact, most “official” definitions of policy say something like this:

Policy [is] a statement by government—at whatever level, in whatever form—of what it intends to do about a public problem. Such statements can be found in the Constitution, statutes, regulation, case law (that is, court decisions), agency or leadership decisions, or even in changes of the behavior of government officials at all levels. For example, a law that says that those caught driving while intoxicated will go to jail for up to one year is a statement of governmental policy to punish drunk drivers. The National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) is a statement of government policy toward the environment….

And: “Policy is what the government chooses to do or not to do” about a public problem.

This is all true. But definitions like this make policy design sound like it’s orderly and contained—much like going to the doctor. You have a problem; the doctor diagnoses it; you two find the best treatment. Creating policy is more like going to the doctor with a problem, having fifteen people argue about if it’s a “real” problem that requires a doctor to begin with, then having five of those people (plus some new strangers!) start arguing anew about what the cause of the problem is, only to be interrupted by the doctor’s boss coming in to tell them that they can only choose two of five possible treatment options because the other three would hurt the hospital’s bottom line. And once treatment begins, people argue over how to determine whether it’s successful and if it should be reversed to save money or time.

Policymaking is not a science. It is a fight over whose problems get addressed, how those problems are addressed, and how public power and resources are distributed. If politics is a fight to elect people who reflect and share our values, policy is a fight to actually enact those values—to mold the world, through the work of government, into what we think it should be.

That is why, contrary to popular belief, the most important part of a policy proposal is not the details—at least at the beginning. It’s the vision that the policy presents. As a statement about what the government is going to do, policy inherently tells a story about what went wrong, how the government can fix it, and who has power to shape society—whether it’s the state or the public or corporations. The best policies tell compelling stories, galvanizing legislators and citizens to fight for them, and provide public servants with a clear purpose when they sit down to implement the details. The stories may shift as opponents pick new battles; the details may need tweaks or overhauls as unexpected challenges emerge. A coherent policy vision provides the foundation that both the stories and the details draw upon. Three pillars—the problem, principles, and power—form that foundation, and anchor policymaking from conception to execution.

Problems are the center of any public policy. Because policy is the government’s response to a problem, policy can only be created if we agree that an issue constitutes not just a problem but a public problem—that is, a problem that affects the public that cannot be solved without the government. How we define the scope and origin of the problem determines how we’ll craft a solution. That’s why fossil fuel companies spend millions to sow doubts about the urgency of the climate crisis and cover up their culpability. It’s not just about saving face; it’s about changing our understanding of the problem and preventing government action.

Principles. Policymakers need a compass to navigate the near-infinite variety of policy designs, and principles— which include both our moral values and our theories of government—provide that compass. Remember, policymaking is collective problem-solving—not an objective “science.” Policymaking, like all decision-making, is guided not only by facts but by our values—about freedom and justice, about what we deserve, about what “other people” deserve and, perhaps most crucially, about what the government should and should not do. Principles are, in short, the moral and intellectual core of a policy. They define not only how we engage with a problem but what solutions we consider at all.

Problems in our society are rooted in power. Asking why a problem remains unresolved leads to questions of power: Who wields it and to what end? Are the powerful negligent or malevolent? By directing and entrenching flows of government resources and attention, policy always shapes the distribution of power. Effective, lasting policy changes must change the distributions of power that led to the problem initially, or else the old malefactors will undermine any success. When selecting the mechanisms a policy will use (a loan; a new legal protection; a direct public investment; a new federal agency), policymakers are deciding how to maintain or disrupt the balance of power. And this is not limited to power in the public sector. Governments write the laws, enforce the contracts, and build the infrastructure that make a society and economy possible. Policy changes reverberate beyond the public sector into every domain of our lives.

Problems, principles, and power are the pillars of any policy vision. Together, they animate the policymaking process, guiding not just the story policymakers tell but the decisions they make about what should (or should not) be included in a given proposal.

IS THE GREEN NEW DEAL A POLICY?

The Green New Deal is a proposal for a ten-year economic mobilization to rapidly transition the US to a zero-carbon economy and, in so doing so, regenerate and reorganize the US economy in ways that significantly reduce inequality and redress legacies of systemic oppression. The congressional Green New Deal (“GND”) resolution has five goals:

1. Achieve net-zero greenhouse gas emissions through a fair and just transition for all communities and workers.

2. Create millions of good, high-wage jobs and ensure prosperity and economic security for all people of the United States.

3. Invest in the infrastructure and industry of the United States to sustainably meet the challenges of the twenty-first century.

4. Secure clean air and water, climate and community resilience, healthy food, access to nature, and a sustainable environment for all.

5. Promote justice and equity by stopping current, preventing future, and repairing historic oppression of frontline and vulnerable communities, including Indigenous peoples, communities of color, migrant communities, deindustrialized communities, depopulated rural communities, the poor, lowincome workers, women, the elderly, the unhoused, people with disabilities, and youth.

The GND resolution proposes to achieve these goals in two ways. The first is through a set of “projects” that, if completed, would nearly eliminate carbon emissions in the US. The second is through a set of policies that aim to protect Americans from the disruption and instability that transitioning away from fossil fuels will create and reduce inequity. Some people like to refer to the first set of projects as the “Green” part of the GND and the second as the “New Deal” part. While this may be a helpful rhetorical device, it is a dangerous way to conceptualize the GND. All parts of the GND advance decarbonization—even the “non-climate” policies like universal health care, education, and job training. Similarly, the “green” projects can help reduce inequity if they are designed to create millions of wellpaying jobs, bolster worker power, invest in local communities, and strengthen the social safety net—all of which the Green New Deal proposes to do. Addressing decarbonization and inequality simultaneously has prompted critics to accuse the GND of being a “progressive wish list,” not a policy. Their criticism often reveals a narrow policy vision guiding their thinking. The problem is simply the carbon in the atmosphere; Mr. Policy Doctor will prescribe the correct solution based on science; imbalances of power are mostly irrelevant, too difficult to disrupt when an urgent crisis needs solving. This is a compelling story. But it cannot guide policymakers tasked with averting catastrophic warming, as many authors in this book show.

The Green New Deal is a new policy vision—one that will guide government and society through the biggest task in modern history: decarbonizing our global economy within the next ten to twenty years. The stories and details of GND policy will undoubtedly change in the coming years, but they will be anchored by the vision—a conception of the problem, a set of principles, and an analysis of power—that the GND provides. Vision, however, is not enough. The GND also establishes a framework for a national economic mobilization and a set of ever-evolving and specific policies that fit within this vision and framework.

#### Only the state can transform society/behavior in time to avoid worst impacts of climate change

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Climate action requires political action simply because, without political action, the scale of the challenge as well as the time within which this action must be achieved cannot be met. If the shutting down of the global economy during the first 4 months of COVID-19 led to an 8 percent annual decrease in carbon emissions, and this decrease is required yearly for the next 10 years, nothing short of coordinated national and international action can be effective. As the logic behind the CoP15 Paris Agreement understood, in a world structured by a system of states, the state remains, in relation with other states, the effective focus for these national and international acts of coordination. One can maintain, of course, that concerted reflection on goals and their practice cannot be rehearsed within the same state system that, in co-evolution with capitalism, has produced the climate problem in the first place.24 Yet, my argument here is simple: (1) climate action must be of a political kind if this action is to be coherent and effective, and the horizon of this understanding of the political (comprehensive and effective action) is in a vital sense defined by the state; (2) this political action redounds above all to the agency and responsibility of the state both in relation to its own citizenry and in relation to other states and their citizenry. In response to the challenge of time and scale, I argue we should turn to, not turn away from, the state as an agent of change. Only if one renounces the potential of political action today through historically constituted practices of political efficacy does one shun this kind of conclusion. In which case, I would argue, one has renounced politics for our age, as well as the major emotion on which politics is based, hope.25 Since Max Weber, the state is sociologically defined by the legitimate monopoly of violence that it holds over all other forms of force within a nationally determined territory.26 There are many ways in which this monopoly is contested today. The description of a state as ‘vulnerable’ is nothing but the indication that a particular state does not hold the monopoly of violence within its territory. Prior to questions of political authority and legitimacy, all states are today vulnerable in this sense given the nature of global challenges that follow intended and unintended processes of interdependence (global financial instability, global terrorism, migration flows, pandemics, climate change, etc.). That said, the responses both to the financial crisis of 2008 and (much more so) to the present COVID-19 crisis testify to the fact that the monopoly of violence particular to the effectiveness of state governance remains in place. Among an increasing complexity of social actors, the state still holds the levers of power that are decisive in effecting social transformation. Consequently, to one side of the empirical fact that countries constitute the beef of the UNFCCC climate regime, I am arguing that the state remains the primary vehicle of a politics of climate change. As the emerging literature on the Green New Deal implies, the state can do the following. At a national level, it can organize and steer fiscal, monetary and sector-policies like those of energy, transport, agriculture, the communications industry and housing in such a way that both businesses and consumers are motivated to shift behaviour towards a carbon-neutral society. This model of the state is one of a regulated market economy that uses the coordination of state direction with market dynamism to effect broad social change. Governments respond to markets as they plan ahead with regard to climate change (the rapid fall in the price of solar and wind energy, for example), and much of the new green infrastructure is/will be locally distributed and assembled (no ‘giant public works’ given that contemporary technology is smart).27 That said, governments are the sole governance body with appropriate fiscal and monetary tools (1) to set up the rebuilding of national economies with new strategic priorities; (2) to steer and to guarantee concerted action across sectors; and (3) to guarantee, in turn, that this action is underpinned by the principles of ‘a just transition’.28 If the timeline to a 50 percent reduction of carbon emissions is 2030, then the state must so organize and steer that solutions to climate change are integrated. Attention to ‘the climate emergency’ alone will not lead to the necessary change. This last point is important and suggests why the idea of the Green New Deal, whether one is on the Left or Right, harbours the appropriate response. The integration of climate policy with radical policies for poverty alleviation and re-employment in sustainable industries and commerce provides the only way in which the shift from an extractive to a regenerative economy and society is possible in the first place. Without this convergence of solutions, practical solutions to climate change will not only tackle the scale and timeline of the problem; they will re-create a deeply divided polity of the employed and unemployed that could lead to ever-worse scenarios of a politics based on division and fear, not community and hope. It is the state alone – in conjunction with the forces of the market and civil society – that can provide the vision, the terms of execution of this vision (organized integration) and, critically, the policy-leverage that can bring about economic and social convergence.

#### Scale and rate of climate change mean there is no time for pessimism, only state focused political action can stop extinction. This isn’t naïve liberal belief in progress, the SQ has already incorporated insights from their critique

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The politics of climate change and the futures of IR What are the implications of the argument of the last two sections for the discipline of International Relations and its futures? I have argued, first, that climate change presents an empirical global challenge that necessitates not only a normative response, but a normative response through politics if this change is not, at worst, to obliterate human possibility, human time and human space. This political response requires, second, comprehensive, integrated political action on a scale and within a timeline that is historically unprecedented. Given both the nature of the response needed and the scale and time within which this response must work, this politics must be structured, third, through the modern state system and through the economic system upon which this system was built (capitalism). In contradistinction to sub-national and post-national forms of governance, it is only the state that has the power and leverage to organize, steer and enable concerted, coordinated, intersectoral action so that a just transition to a carbon-neutral, indeed carbon-negative society is in the least possible by 2050. If it is only the state in principle that can do this, the success of its action will, at the same time, only happen through enabling other actors across society (both domestic and global) to work to the end of transition more effectively than itself – in energy markets, in local areas, in financial investment strategies for nature-based solutions, in behavioural change towards a society of limits and so forth. The argument is, consequently, not state-centric; it posits that the state, within processes of social agency and social transformation, is the sole political instance of governance, at the same time, to enable and steer in an integrated, comprehensive manner. Fourth, I argue, therefore, that, against the background of faltering global governance regimes and a renewed nationalist mindset, it is the state that bears the responsibility, both towards its own citizens and towards those most vulnerable to the effects of climate change, to respond to climate change and lead, with international institutions, climate alliances among states. Finally, fifth, I have intimated that it is through these alliances that coordinated global climate action will emerge that reorganizes the development agenda beyond the distinction between North and South. A new global order could emerge from this reorganization, in response to climate change. This sequence of points means that a state-focused perspective on international politics must continue to be embraced in the discipline of IR for the coming decades. In the last 40 years, and partly as a healthy intellectual reaction against the supposed domination of state-centred realism and inter-state liberalism in the discipline, there have been multiple initiatives in IR to step to one side of the state and seek the grain of international politics in other actors and processes (from Susan Strange’s Retreat of the State41 to recent critical theoretical interest, as also exemplified in this SI, in the ‘posthuman’). These diverse initiatives have made the discipline intellectually richer and more inter- and pluri-disciplinary. They have, I would suggest, come at the cost, however, of losing grasp of the state where and when the state remains a necessary agent of change. This article has argued that this is foremostly the case when it comes to responding to climate change. From this perspective, continued engagement with the state as an agent of change requires that the discipline as a whole re-engages with the legacy of Weberian realism (the state and the state system), the legacy of classical realism (the ethics of the lesser violence in world of limitation) and the legacy of the English School (state responsibility and state leadership), together with the insights of constructivism, in order to reconstruct domestic and foreign policies in tight relation to climate change and its effects.42 Only, perhaps, as a result of this reconstruction can something like a reinvigorated liberal internationalism emerge that has authentically cosmopolitan aspirations: that is, aspirations that do not redound to the national interests of the more powerful states, but seek to organize, amid the risks of regression, conflict and the greater violence, a global order of sustainable development and sustainability that transcends the conceptual and practical ‘North/South’ divide. A great deal needs to be unpacked in the suggestions of the last paragraph in order to map how the various theoretical legacies in IR can be turned to the most complex human interconnection at hand: climate change. Suffice it to add here three things of import. First, the discipline’s response to climate change must work across its various traditions and ‘schools’ to have ontological, epistemological, ethical and political traction upon it. I have maintained that the state must be foregrounded in this response, but this foregrounding can only make sense if the state is seen to be working in, through, and for a larger environment of actors and their practices. The discipline of IR needs to provide normative vision for, and empirical analysis of, this coordinated set of arrangements. Second, the move to deepen and reconfigure the sustainable development agenda in the light of response to climate change should, I have suggested several times, be far-reaching. Vision for, and analysis of, the ever-closer connections between the disciplines of International Relations and International Development must be forged; for example, connections based not on conflict and post-conflict scenarios, but primarily on what sustainable resilience means conceptually and policy-wise across all states and their populations. Third, and finally, a new academic mindset in the discipline may be required; or it should at least be fostered through the discipline. At a theoretical level, liberalism is considered the one ‘optimistic’ tradition within IR, a tradition predicated on belief in rational politics and cooperation, progress and embetterment. Liberalism harbours an optimism the very critique of which often defines the respective critical mindsets of realism, Marxism, feminism, post-colonialism (and) IR critical theory. These critiques have again been very rich for the discipline of IR over the last 40 years, perhaps, most tellingly for the contemporary student with regard to the hubris of post-Cold War liberalisms. In the context of climate change’s challenge for IR, a fierce optimism is nevertheless now required: an optimism no longer harnessed to the nineteenth- and twentieth-century terms of liberal progress, but a mindset of purpose that is focused, deftly aggressive and sustained within the logics of sustainable resilience. Given both the time and the scale of political action required for net-zero national and global societies to emerge by 2050, there is, in essence, no time to be pessimistic or sceptical; whatever happens empirically in the next 30 years, there is the time to place sustained, focused pressure on political institutions and their leaders so that social transformation towards a national and global society of limits is brought about. In this sense, fiercely optimistic, bearers of the discipline of IR should assume a strong intellectual, pedagogical and social role in the three coming decades.

#### Political battle over positive vision of national sovereignty key to defeat fascism.

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Given neoliberalism’s war against sovereignty, it should come as no surprise that ‘sovereignty has become the master-frame of contemporary politics’, as Paolo Gerbaudo notes.4 After all, as we argue in Chapter 5, the hollowing out of national sovereignty and curtailment of popular-democratic mechanisms – what has been termed depoliticisation – has been an essential element of the neoliberal project, aimed at insulating macroeconomic policies from popular contestation and removing any obstacles put in the way of economic exchanges and financial flows. Given the nefarious effects of depoliticisation, it is only natural that the revolt against neoliberalism should first and foremost take the form of demands for a repoliticisation of national decision-making processes. The fact that the vision of national sovereignty that was at the centre of the Trump and Brexit campaigns, and that currently dominates the public discourse, is a reactionary, quasi-fascist one – mostly defined along ethnic, exclusivist and authoritarian lines – should not be seen as an indictment of national sovereignty as such. History attests to the fact that national sovereignty and national self-determination are not intrinsically reactionary or jingoistic concepts – in fact, they were the rallying cries of countless nineteenth- and twentieth-century socialist and left-wing liberation movements.

Even if we limit our analysis to core capitalist countries, it is patently obvious that virtually all the major social, economic and political advancements of the past centuries were achieved through the institutions of the democratic nation state, not through international, multilateral or supranational institutions, which in a number of ways have, in fact, been used to roll back those very achievements, as we have seen in the context of the euro crisis, where supranational (and largely unaccountable) institutions such as the European Commission, Eurogroup and European Central Bank (ECB) used their power and authority to impose crippling austerity on struggling countries. The problem, in short, is not national sovereignty as such, but the fact that the concept in recent years has been largely monopolised by the right and extreme right, which understandably sees it as a way to push through its xenophobic and identitarian agenda. It would therefore be a grave mistake to explain away the seduction of the ‘Trumpenproletariat’ by the far right as a case of false consciousness, as Marc Saxer notes;5 the working classes are simply turning to the only movements and parties that (so far) promise them some protection from the brutal currents of neoliberal globalisation (whether they can or truly intend to deliver on that promise is a different matter).

However, this simply raises an even bigger question: why has the left not been able to offer the working classes and increasingly proletarianised middle classes a credible alternative to neoliberalism and to neoliberal globalisation? More to the point, why has it not been able to develop a progressive view of national sovereignty? As we argue in this book, the reasons are numerous and overlapping. For starters, it is important to understand that the current existential crisis of the left has very deep historical roots, reaching as far back as the 1960s. If we want to comprehend how the left has gone astray, that is where we have to begin our analysis.

Today the post-war ‘Keynesian’ era is eulogised by many on the left as a golden age in which organised labour and enlightened thinkers and policymakers (such as Keynes himself) were able to impose a ‘class compromise’ on reluctant capitalists that delivered unprecedented levels of social progress, which were subsequently rolled back following the so-called neoliberal counter-revolution. It is thus argued that, in order to overcome neoliberalism, all it takes is for enough members of the establishment to be swayed by an alternative set of ideas. However, as we note in Chapter 2, the rise and fall of Keynesianism cannot simply be explained in terms of working-class strength or the victory of one ideology over another, but should instead be viewed as the outcome of the fortuitous confluence, in the aftermath of World War II, of a number of social, ideological, political, economic, technical and institutional conditions.

To fail to do so is to commit the same mistake that many leftists committed in the early post-war years. By failing to appreciate the extent to which the class compromise at the base of the Fordist-Keynesian system was, in fact, a crucial component of that history-specific regime of accumulation – actively supported by the capitalist class insofar as it was conducive to profit-making, and bound to be jettisoned once it ceased to be so – many socialists of the time convinced themselves ‘that they had done much more than they actually had to shift the balance of class power, and the relationship between states and markets’.6 Some even argued that the developed world had already entered a post-capitalist phase, in which all the characteristic features of capitalism had been permanently eliminated, thanks to a fundamental shift of power in favour of labour vis-à-vis capital, and of the state vis-à-vis the market. Needless to say, that was not the case. Furthermore, as we show in Chapter 3, monetarism – the ideological precursor to neoliberalism – had already started to percolate into left-wing policymaking circles as early as the late 1960s.

Thus, as argued in Chapters 2 and 3, many on the left found themselves lacking the necessary theoretical tools to understand – and correctly respond to – the capitalist crisis that engulfed the Keynesian model in the 1970s, convincing themselves that the distributional struggle that arose at the time could be resolved within the narrow limits of the social-democratic framework. The truth of the matter was that the labour–capital conflict that re-emerged in the 1970s could only have been resolved one way or another: on capital’s terms, through a reduction of labour’s bargaining power, or on labour’s terms, through an extension of the state’s control over investment and production. As we show in Chapters 3 and 4, with regard to the experience of the social-democratic governments of Britain and France in the 1970s and 1980s, the left proved unwilling to go this way. This left it (no pun intended) with no other choice but to ‘manage the capitalist crisis on behalf of capital’, as Stuart Hall wrote, by ideologically and politically legitimising neoliberalism as the only solution to the survival of capitalism.7

In this regard, as we show in Chapter 3, the Labour government of James Callaghan (1974–9) bears a very heavy responsibility. In an (in)famous speech in 1976, Callaghan justified the government’s programme of spending cuts and wage restraint by declaring Keynesianism dead, indirectly legitimising the emerging monetarist (neoliberal) dogma and effectively setting up the conditions for Labour’s ‘austerity lite’ to be refined into an all-out attack on the working class by Margaret Thatcher. Even worse, perhaps, Callaghan popularised the notion that austerity was the only solution to the economic crisis of the 1970s, anticipating Thatcher’s ‘there is no alternative’ (TINA) mantra, even though there were radical alternatives available at the time, such as those put forward by Tony Benn and others. These, however, were ‘no longer perceived to exist’.8 In this sense, the dismantling of the post-war Keynesian framework cannot simply be explained as the victory of one ideology (‘neoliberalism’) over another (‘Keynesianism’), but should rather be understood as the result of a number of overlapping ideological, economic and political factors: the capitalists’ response to the profit squeeze and to the political implications of full employment policies; the structural flaws of ‘actually existing Keynesianism’; and, importantly, the left’s inability to offer a coherent response to the crisis of the Keynesian framework, let alone a radical alternative. These are all analysed in-depth in the first chapters of the book.

Furthermore, throughout the 1970s and 1980s, a new (fallacious) left consensus started to set in: that economic and financial internationalisation – what today we call ‘globalisation’ – had rendered the state increasingly powerless vis-à-vis ‘the forces of the market’, and that therefore countries had little choice but to abandon national economic strategies and all the traditional instruments of intervention in the economy (such as tariffs and other trade barriers, capital controls, currency and exchange rate manipulation, and fiscal and central bank policies), and hope, at best, for transnational or supranational forms of economic governance. In other words, government intervention in the economy came to be seen not only as ineffective but, increasingly, as outright impossible. This process – which was generally (and erroneously, as we shall see) framed as a shift from the state to the market – was accompanied by a ferocious attack on the very idea of national sovereignty, increasingly vilified as a relic of the past. As we show, the left – in particular the European left – played a crucial role in this regard as well, by cementing this ideological shift towards a post-national and post-sovereign view of the world, often anticipating the right on these issues.

One of the most consequential turning points in this respect, which is analysed in Chapter 4, was Mitterrand’s 1983 turn to austerity – the so-called tournant de la rigueur – just two years after the French Socialists’ historic victory in 1981. Mitterrand’s election had inspired the widespread belief that a radical break with capitalism – at least with the extreme form of capitalism that had recently taken hold in the Anglo-Saxon world – was still possible. By 1983, however, the French Socialists had succeeded in ‘proving’ the exact opposite: that neoliberal globalisation was an inescapable and inevitable reality. As Mitterrand stated at the time: ‘National sovereignty no longer means very much, or has much scope in the modern world economy. … A high degree of supra-nationality is essential.’9

The repercussions of Mitterrand’s about-turn are still being felt today. It is often brandished by left-wing and progressive intellectuals as proof of the fact that globalisation and the internationalisation of finance has ended the era of nation states and their capacity to pursue policies that are not in accord with the diktats of global capital. The claim is that if a government tries autonomously to pursue full employment and a progressive/redistributive agenda, it will inevitably be punished by the amorphous forces of global capital. This narrative claims that Mitterrand had no option but to abandon his agenda of radical reform. To most modern-day leftists, Mitterrand thus represents a pragmatist who was cognisant of the international capitalist forces he was up against and responsible enough to do what was best for France.

In fact, as we argue in the second part of the book, sovereign, currency-issuing states – such as France in the 1980s – far from being helpless against the power of global capital, still have the capacity to deliver full employment and social justice to their citizens. So how did the idea of the ‘death of the state’ come to be so ingrained in our collective consciousness? As we explain in Chapter 5, underlying this post-national view of the world was (is) a failure to understand – and in some cases an explicit attempt to conceal – on behalf of left-wing intellectuals and policymakers that ‘globalisation’ was (is) not the result of inexorable economic and technological changes but was (is) largely the product of state-driven processes. All the elements that we associate with neoliberal globalisation – delocalisation, deindustrialisation, the free movement of goods and capital, etc. – were (are), in most cases, the result of choices made by governments. More generally, states continue to play a crucial role in promoting, enforcing and sustaining a (neo)liberal international framework – though that would appear to be changing, as we discuss in Chapter 6 – as well as establishing the domestic conditions for allowing global accumulation to flourish.

The same can be said of neoliberalism tout court. There is a widespread belief – particularly among the left – that neoliberalism has involved (and involves) a ‘retreat’, ‘hollowing out’ or ‘withering away’ of the state, which in turn has fuelled the notion that today the state has been ‘overpowered’ by the market. However, as we argue in Chapter 5, neoliberalism has not entailed a retreat of the state but rather a reconfiguration of the state, aimed at placing the commanding heights of economic policy ‘in the hands of capital, and primarily financial interests’.10

It is self-evident, after all, that the process of neoliberalisation would not have been possible if governments – and in particular social-democratic governments – had not resorted to a wide array of tools to promote it: the liberalisation of goods and capital markets; the privatisation of resources and social services; the deregulation of business, and financial markets in particular; the reduction of workers’ rights (first and foremost, the right to collective bargaining) and more generally the repression of labour activism; the lowering of taxes on wealth and capital, at the expense of the middle and working classes; the slashing of social programmes; and so on. These policies were systemically pursued throughout the West (and imposed on developing countries) with unprecedented determination, and with the support of all the major international institutions and political parties.

As noted in Chapter 5, even the loss of national sovereignty – which has been invoked in the past, and continues to be invoked today, to justify neoliberal policies – is largely the result of a willing and conscious limitation of state sovereign rights by national elites. The reason why governments chose willingly to ‘tie their hands’ is all too clear: as the European case epitomises, the creation of self-imposed ‘external constraints’ allowed national politicians to reduce the politics costs of the neoliberal transition – which clearly involved unpopular policies – by ‘scapegoating’ institutionalised rules and ‘independent’ or international institutions, which in turn were presented as an inevitable outcome of the new, harsh realities of globalisation.

Moreover, neoliberalism has been (and is) associated with various forms of authoritarian statism – that is, the opposite of the minimal state advocated by neoliberals – as states have bolstered their security and policing arms as part of a generalised militarisation of civil protest. In other words, not only does neoliberal economic policy require the presence of a strong state, but it requires the presence of an authoritarian state (particularly where extreme forms of neoliberalism are concerned, such as the ones experimented with in periphery countries), at both the domestic and international level (see Chapter 5). In this sense, neoliberal ideology, at least in its official anti-state guise, should be considered little more than a convenient alibi for what has been and is essentially a political and state-driven project. Capital remains as dependent on the state today as it was under ‘Keynesianism’ – to police the working classes, bail out large firms that would otherwise go bankrupt, open up markets abroad (including through military intervention), etc. The ultimate irony, or indecency, is that traditional left establishment parties have become standard-bearers for neoliberalism themselves, both while in elected office and in opposition.

In the months and years that followed the financial crash of 2007–9, capital’s – and capitalism’s – continued dependency on the state in the age of neoliberalism became glaringly obvious, as the governments of the US, Europe and elsewhere bailed out their respective financial institutions to the tune of trillions of euros/dollars. In Europe, following the outbreak of the so-called ‘euro crisis’ in 2010, this was accompanied by a multi-level assault on the post-war European social and economic model aimed at restructuring and re-engineering European societies and economies along lines more favourable to capital. This radical reconfiguration of European societies – which, again, has seen social-democratic governments at the forefront – is not based on a retreat of the state in favour of the market, but rather on a reintensification of state intervention on the side of capital.

Nonetheless, the erroneous idea of the waning nation state has become an entrenched fixture of the left. As we argue throughout the book, we consider this to be central in understanding the decline of the traditional political left and its acquiescence to neoliberalism. In view of the above, it is hardly surprising that the mainstream left is, today, utterly incapable of offering a positive vision of national sovereignty in response to neoliberal globalisation. To make matters worse, most leftists have bought into the macroeconomic myths that the establishment uses to discourage any alternative use of state fiscal capacities. For example, they have accepted without question the so-called household budget analogy, which suggests that currency-issuing governments, like households, are financially constrained, and that fiscal deficits impose crippling debt burdens on future generations – a notion that we thoroughly debunk in Chapter 8.

This has gone hand in hand with another, equally tragic, development. As discussed in Chapter 5, following its historical defeat, the left’s traditional anti-capitalist focus on class slowly gave way to a liberal individualist understanding of emancipation. Waylaid by post-modernist and post-structuralist theories, left intellectuals slowly abandoned Marxian class categories to focus, instead, on elements of political power and the use of language and narratives as a way of establishing meaning. This also defined new arenas of political struggle that were diametrically opposed to those defined by Marx. Over the past three decades, the left focus on ‘capitalism’ has given way to a focus on issues such as racism, gender, homophobia, multiculturalism, etc. Marginality is no longer described in terms of class but rather in terms of identity. The struggle against the illegitimate hegemony of the capitalist class has given way to the struggles of a variety of (more or less) oppressed and marginalised groups: women, ethnic and racial minorities, the LGBTQ community, etc. As a result, class struggle has ceased to be seen as the path to liberation.

In this new post-modernist world, only categories that transcend Marxian class boundaries are considered meaningful. Moreover, the institutions that evolved to defend workers against capital – such as trade unions and social-democratic political parties – have become subjugated to these non-class struggle foci. What has emerged in practically all Western countries as a result, as Nancy Fraser notes, is a perverse political alignment between ‘mainstream currents of new social movements (feminism, anti-racism, multiculturalism, and LGBTQ rights), on the one side, and high-end “symbolic” and service-based business sectors (Wall Street, Silicon Valley, and Hollywood), on the other’.11 The result is a progressive neoliberalism ‘that mix[es] together truncated ideals of emancipation and lethal forms of financialization’, with the former unwittingly lending their charisma to the latter.

As societies have become increasingly divided between well-educated, highly mobile, highly skilled, socially progressive cosmopolitan urbanites, and lower-skilled and less educated peripherals who rarely work abroad and face competition from immigrants, the mainstream left has tended to consistently side with the former. Indeed, the split between the working classes and the intellectual-cultural left can be considered one of the main reasons behind the right-wing revolt currently engulfing the West. As argued by Jonathan Haidt, the way the globalist urban elites talk and act unwittingly activates authoritarian tendencies in a subset of nationalists.12 In a vicious feedback loop, however, the more the working classes turn to right-wing populism and nationalism, the more the intellectual-cultural left doubles down on its liberal-cosmopolitan fantasies, further radicalising the ethno-nationalism of the proletariat. As Wolfgang Streeck writes:

Protests against material and moral degradation are suspected of being essentially fascist, especially now that the former advocates of the plebeian classes have switched to the globalization party, so that if their former clients wish to complain about the pressures of capitalist modernization, the only language at their disposal is the pre-political, untreated linguistic raw material of everyday experiences of deprivation, economic or cultural. This results in constant breaches of the rules of civilized public speech, which in turn can trigger indignation at the top and mobilization at the bottom.13

This is particularly evident in the European debate, where, despite the disastrous effects of the EU and monetary union, the mainstream left – often appealing to exactly the same arguments used by Callaghan and Mitterrand 30–40 years ago – continues to cling on to these institutions and to the belief that they can be reformed in a progressive direction, despite all evidence to the contrary, and to dismiss any talk of restoring a progressive agenda on the foundation of retrieved national sovereignty as a ‘retreat into nationalist positions’, inevitably bound to plunge the continent into 1930s-style fascism.14 This position, as irrational as it may be, is not surprising, considering that European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) is, after all, a brainchild of the European left (see Chapter 5). However, such a position presents numerous problems, which are ultimately rooted in a failure to understand the true nature of the EU and monetary union. First of all, it ignores the fact that the EU’s economic and political constitution is structured to produce the results that we are seeing – the erosion of popular sovereignty, the massive transfer of wealth from the middle and lower classes to the upper classes, the weakening of labour and more generally the rollback of the democratic and social/economic gains that had previously been achieved by subordinate classes – and is designed precisely to impede the kind of radical reforms to which progressive integrationists or federalists aspire to.

More importantly, however, it effectively reduces the left to the role of defender of the status quo, thus allowing the political right to hegemonise the legitimate anti-systemic – and specifically anti-EU – grievances of citizens. This is tantamount to relinquishing the discursive and political battleground for a post-neoliberal hegemony – which is inextricably linked to the question of national sovereignty – to the right and extreme right. It is not hard to see that if progressive change can only be implemented at the global or even European level – in other words, if the alternative to the status quo offered to electorates is one between reactionary nationalism and progressive globalism – then the left has already lost the battle.

## Case

### AT: Wynter – 1NC

1. **The 1AC’s refusal of Man is naïve decolonization that prematurely discards valuable tools for emancipation at the first whiff of colonial association.**

**Meagher, 18**—University of Connecticut (Thomas, “Maturity in a Human World: A Philosophical Study,” <https://opencommons.uconn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=8155&context=dissertations>, dml)

Of course, these reflections take as their point of departure not a universal and ahistoric form of patriarchy, misogyny, or sexism, but rather a **historically particular form** instantiated through **Euro-modern colonialism** (Wynter, 1990; Oyèwùmí, 1997; Lugones 2007). What is it at issue is not so much the intersection of standalone forms of racism and sexism, but rather their mutual co-constitution through an imperial and colonial matrix of power. Following Sylvia **Wynter**, we may then raise the issue that the problem of maturity may be linked to what she terms “the **over-representation of Man** as if it were the human” (2003). “Man” takes as its point of reference a white, European or Euro-American bourgeois male, a “global breadwinner” whose economic mastery is attributable not to illegitimate regimes of appropriation and exploitation but rather to Man’s intrinsic virtue. The modern episteme, Wynter contends, is premised on **elevating Man** to the status of an **a priori ideal** of humanity. A consequence is that modern forms of knowledge are shrouded in a logic of “**biodicy**” (Wynter, 2006), in which whatever ills humanity confronts can be attributed not to the misdeeds of Man but rather to the intrinsic lack of value to be found in those human beings who are not Man – women, people of color, the global poor, etc. As such, the imperative lurking behind Euro-modern conceptions of maturity, as well as their enshrinement and naturalization within Euro-modern institutions, may be not only “be a man” but simply “be Man.”

“Man,” of course, stands ambiguously at the heart of many modern discourses. On the one hand, “man” can be taken to refer explicitly and particularly to adult males. On the other hand, “man” and “mankind” are taken to refer to humanity in general, with similarly gendered pronouns and suffixes serving as generic referents. Feminist thought has long had to reckon with the ripe conditions for equivocation that this engenders, and Wynter and other thinkers confronting problems of racism and coloniality have gone further in establishing that for Euromodernity, “man” equivocates between references to all human beings and references merely to European peoples (and perhaps the occasional “honorary white”).

Yet receiving much less attention is another central ambiguity: if “man” has an equivocal relation to categories of race and gender, what of its relation to age and adulthood? If Euromodern discourses on man over-represent a racialized, gendered, classed subject as if it represented humanity writ large, is there a similar error in over-representing the adult as if it were all humanity? Clearly, it would be an error to say, for instance, that human rights are rights by virtue of one’s having attained adulthood; the “rights of man” often refer to rights that would appear to be the human rights of children as well as adults. Indeed, there may be some human rights that are distinctly owed to children – consider, for instance, S. Matthew Liao’s argument that children have a right to be loved (Liao, 2015). Yet here the issue of paternalism emerges, a source of recurring debates in Euro-modern thought due to its imbrication in colonial and patriarchal modes of power. If children have a right to have guardians, then the debate rages as to whether the child-like should likewise have some form of protectorate imposed upon them.

Here a critical response emerges: if paternalism functions as a Trojan horse for colonization and patriarchy, then perhaps it simply ought to be rejected wholesale. Hence, what if decolonizing values requires discarding the notion of maturity altogether? In other words, maturity is woven into the fabric Euro-modern values, and it is therefore a medium for the propagation of coloniality. Where efforts to value maturity are present, it seems, the valorization of “Man” and devalorization of women, people of color, etc. lurks in the shadows. If Wynter’s call is for “the human after Man,” then it might follow that what is needed is the achievement of the human after maturity.

b. The Problem of Naïve Decolonization

The notion that **any values associated with colonialism** or **coloniality** ought to be **discarded**, however, is **fraught with problems**. The apt metaphor here pertains to the folly of throwing babies out with the bathwater. Colonialism is an effort to **instrumentalize** land, people, culture, values, and knowledge; it **invariably makes use** of that which is valued **prior to colonization**. This is not to say that colonialism does not introduce new values of its own, but even where this is the case, colonialism often seeks to impose these through **projects of cooptation** that are established in reference to the values that **precede them**. In brief, the issue is that efforts to value maturity are **by no means original** or **exclusive** to Euro-modernity and coloniality.

Consider here Ifeanyi Menkiti’s contention (1984, 2004) that it is typical of African conceptions of personhood that one must mature in order to become a person. Full personhood is not a product of birth alone but is rather achieved through the acts and influences that make one meaningfully a member of a community. The claim, then, is not simply that it is better to be mature than not, but rather that a type of maturity is requisite to attain an ontological status of personhood: “passage through time helps create not only a qualitative difference between young and old, but also an ontologically significant one” (Menkiti, 2004: 325). The notion of maturity as bearing **normative significance** and even the notion of maturity as constitutive of the **difference** between those who are **fully human** and those who are **not** are **not purely European** or **colonial inventions**. This is not to say that Europe did not re-invent notions of maturity or bring to them a significance that was **distinctly colonial** and **not indigenous** to a pre-colonial context. Nor is it to claim that it was African societies’ normative attachment to forms of maturity that made them more susceptible to efforts of European colonization. The point is simply that maturity refers, ultimately, to ideals about which many societies have had constructive ideas **prior to colonization**, and the fact that there are **colonial ideals** of maturity, as well as **precolonial conceptions** of maturity that have been **colonized** and **transformed** in the process, **does not imply** that maturity ought to be **discarded wholesale** on the grounds that it is **no more than a colonial artifact**.

The effort to **reject whatever is associated with colonizers** or **epochs of colonization** can be termed “**naïve decolonization**.” I do not mean to suggest that decolonization is **itself naïve** but rather that one can **distinguish** between forms of decolonization that are **naïve** and forms that are **mature**. Naïve decolonization often works according to the logic of **guilt by association**. Under this framework, decolonization’s **chief responsibility** becomes to **repudiate whatever happens to be associated with the colonizers**. The problem with such an approach is one that Aimé Césaire raised in Discourse on Colonialism (2000): that to **oppose colonialism**, to maintain that it dehumanizes both colonized and colonizer, **does not mean** that one can **go back to a pre-colonial world**. Frantz Fanon, likewise, issued the call to “Leave this Europe where they are never done talking of Man, yet murder men everywhere they find them” (1963: 311), but this “leaving” meant to refuse the claim that Europe was an adequate model, that its “successes” made it worthy of imitation. “It is a question,” Fanon wrote, “of the Third World starting a new history of Man, a history which will have regard to the sometimes prodigious theses which Europe has put forward, but which will also not forget Europe’s crimes, of which the most horrible was committed in the heart of man, and consisted of the pathological tearing apart of his functions and the crumbling away of his unity” (1963: 315). In short, the **imperative** to build a world **no longer suffering** from colonial pathologies may **require** that one **not discard all European thought** in much the way that European intellectuals often claimed that **all non-European thought could be discarded**. Naïve decolonization regards **repudiation of the colonial as sufficient** for decolonization; mature decolonization confronts a responsibility to **build a world** that is **genuinely after colonialism**, a world, as Fanon called for, in which tools would not possess human beings and enslavement would be brought to a permanent end, and wherein it would be possible for human beings to discover and love each other, wherever they may be (1967a: 231).

In that sense, we may issue a **warning** that **Wynter’s call** for “the **human**, **after Man**” **may not mean**, as such, the **death of Man**. The obvious points of reference here are Michel Foucault’s vision that man could be erased “like a face drawn in the sand at the edge of the sea” (Foucault 1994: 387) and Friedrich Nietzsche’s “God is dead. … And we have killed him” (Nietzsche 2001: §125). The **problem** with a call for Man’s death is that the death of Man is **not necessarily the end of Man’s power**. That Man should have hegemonic power in shaping the world, in organizing it in such a fashion so that each of its part serves Man’s ends, is an acute concern. But the death of Man **does not guarantee the diminishment** of such power. Foucault had expressed a similar concern in warning that **having literally cut off the king’s head does not ensure that one will have done likewise** in the realm of political theory (Foucault, 1978: 88-9); the question can remain, though, as to whether even cutting off the king’s head in political theory would eradicate the king’s power over how politics is thought about. Here African ontologies suggest a relevant point of consideration: the death of ancestors does not eradicate their power with regard to present and future generations (Gyekye, 1995: 68–84; Henry, 2000: 26–43; L.R. Gordon, 2006: 58–61).

Wynter, in building off of and beyond Foucault’s framework, discussed these matters in terms of “**transumptive chains**” that **govern the shift** from one episteme and epoch of power to another. The **symbols** and **modes of knowledge production** put into effect to undergird one regime of power, do not “**resume**” so much as “**transume**” – that is, their **interruption by revolutions** and **epistemic breaks** yields their continuation in **altered forms**. The “death of God” at issue for Nietzsche and others was less an issue of God’s absence and more an issue of how God had been replaced; could science, philosophy, or Man really serve the knowledge- and world-orienting roles that God had? To ask of humanistic institutions that they replace God is, in its own way, a continuation of the power of God: it is to impose a demand that is exogenous to those institutions and that may transcend their capacities quite drastically. The degodding of the Western episteme, Wynter contends, moved it out of a Christocentric framework of knowledge production into a partially secularized episteme of **Man-1**, premised on the centrality and ideality of “**homo politicus**,” which in turn was further degodded and begot **Man-2**, the episteme of “**homo oeconomicus**” (Wynter, 2003, 2006). But the **structure of the argument** implies that present efforts toward decolonization could, **simply**, **beget Man-3**, and simply because one takes as one’s aim that one will kill Man-2 **does not negate the possibility** that one’s efforts will **culminate in the hegemony of Man-3**.

A further reference point of relevance, then, is Sigmund Freud’s notion of the Oedipus complex (Freud, 1977: 207–8, 328–38). Human beings enter into a world in which they are cared for, but their maturation facilitates the diminution of that care. Confrontation with an adult world, though, may spark forms of resentment that engender an anxious or oppositional relation to those by whom one has been nurtured. The notion of the Oedipus complex suggests a desire to displace and replace those sources of care, and the structure of such desire would be to persist without reflective awareness: e.g., I want to spite my father by surpassing him and reincarnate my mother’s love through another, but I may fail to understand that this desire is implicitly manifest in my acts. The psychoanalyst, then, can point to the structural tendency of human existence to produce Oedipal desires, and for the patient under analysis, this can facilitate reflection on how one’s behavior may ultimately be the symbolic expression of the Oedipal. Fanon (1967a), though, by taking this method seriously, saw that a rigid interpretation of it would have to be transcended, for in a colonized society, the sociogenesis of Oedipal structures would be quite different than it would be in the European context that stimulated Freud’s explorations. If in both France and Martinique it was Man that was symbolically produced as paragon of value, then the investment of Oedipal desire in one’s father could be typical among white children in France and atypical among black children in Martinique. The tragic consequence is that many black people would, in turn, act upon these desires unreflectively, pursuing dreams of integration and white acceptance that were simply unrealizable. Hence, the Oedipal could, in the colonial context, be an extension of colonial power, part of the array of psychological tools that undergird domination. A further problem, then, is evident even in opposition to the colonizer: pursuing the **death of the colonizer**, to **passionately seek the death of Man**, could be to **fail to confront** the causes of one’s debilitation and, indeed, to **exacerbate them**.

Psychoanalysis hinges on the importance of moving from a naïve understanding of one’s desires to a mature one. Ironically, this point is often lost on many of those who repudiate Freudian psychoanalysis. Indeed, both in positivist and post-structuralist psychologies there is much evidence of an Oedipal relationship to Freud, an over-investment in, as it were, cutting off his head in psychological theory. This may take pathological expression where it means that one recapitulates the worst of Freud’s mistakes and discards his most prescient insights. An example is illustrated by Emma Perez’s criticism of Félix Guattari and Gilles Deleuze’s Anti-Oedipus. If Guattari and Deleuze are correct that the Oedipal does not arise in the pre-colonial kinship structures of the non-West, it does not thereby follow, Perez contends, that colonization has not imposed the Oedipal on them. To resist the Oedipal diagnosis, in short, does not combat the “Oedipalization” that coloniality puts into place (Perez, 1999: 102–110). The “anti-” of antiOedipus may, ultimately, betray an Oedipal anxiety at the heart of post-structuralist efforts to hasten the death of their forbears. So, too, for positivist approaches that, repelled by the limitations of the “talking cure” approach of psychoanalysis, beget an uncritical and at times fetishistic relationship to neurophysiological reductionism. That there are limitations to the early articulations of psychoanalysis does not entail that one ought to overlook its strengths, in the same way that the psychoanalyst may recommend that the patient respond to the influence of a flawed parent by at least attempting to grasp and understand the parent’s genuine virtues and accomplishments; otherwise, the disdain may become pathological. The point of examining structures of Oedipal desire is not to discover an inevitable fate – to find that one is doomed to pathology and catastrophe – but rather to help one take responsibility for reflecting upon what one really wants and needs and, to use Fanon’s term, to be actional in the face of powers one cannot fully eradicate.

What Fanon and Perez point to, then, is a model of mature decolonization for which the mere acceptance and application of European ideas and concepts is inadequate but for which the wholesale and uncritical repudiation of those ideas and concepts is undesirable and irresponsible. Hence, the **maturity of decolonization** involves **heeding** both Audre Lorde’s warning that it would be naïve to expect the master’s tools to dismantle the master’s house (Lorde, 1984: 110–3) as well as **Jane** and **Lewis Gordon’s warning** that the effort to dismantle the master’s house is **necessary** but **insufficient** for projects of decolonization (Gordon and Gordon, 2006). The master is, indeed, **well-versed** in how to **use his tools to maintain his house**; for this reason, decolonization that **limits itself to immanent critique** of the Euro-modern intellectual canon is likely doomed to **tilt at windmills**, for this canon was by and large erected in order to **facilitate enduring modes** of coloniality. But the diminution of the master’s power is **not merely a matter of dismantling his house**, and **tools** that the master has sought to employ **might nonetheless be useful to construct other houses**, to **create alternative possibilities** and **futures**. In short, naïve decolonization takes its responsibilities as **delimited** by the need to **overthrow the master**, but mature decolonization encounters an **expanded responsibility** which demands the **creative** and **critical apprehension** of the **resources** and **inventions** that can **build a new world** and set afoot a **new humanity**. As such, it **needs to be wary** of naïve decolonization, for, among other issues, naïve decolonization is a **tool** that masters **can manipulate**, **have manipulated**, and may even at times **appropriate as their own**. Think, for instance, of the many ways in which the ideal of a **color-blind society**, offered up initially as an **anti-colonial idea**, has been turned into an **asinine** but **effective tool** for passing and upholding policies with **racist effects**, or the ways in which the expansion of U.S. colonial power **drew upon exploitation** of the so-called “**Black Legend**” to replace Spanish colonial power **without eradicating the colonial standing** of the locales thus “liberated.”

To speak of “naïve decolonization” at all, though, is to raise a thorny linguistic issue, for “naïve” shares its etymological roots with the term “native.” The notion that its articulation in modern French and English vernaculars is completely unrelated to conceptions of “natives” in the colonies strains credulity. To decolonize the concepts that shroud intellectual production and normative life requires critical reflection on the relationship between the concepts as inherited and the greater conceptual scheme of which they are parts. So, for instance, we may speak of the efforts of those like Kwasi Wiredu (1997: 136–144) or Ngũgĩ wa Thiong’o (1986) toward decolonization by way of rethinking concepts from the perspective of languages not imposed by colonizers and, indeed, to be able to think enmeshed in these languages rather than as a merely occasional visitor to them. But it **does not follow** that one is **in all cases better off** by having **abandoned terms** that appear in the language of the colonizer, and the imperative of crosscultural communication – both in general and in the particular case of projects of decolonization – may require being able to **critically** and **reflectively employ language** that is neither **purely innocent** nor **purely colonizing** in its **pragmatic effects**. “Naïve” may simply refer to a cultural universal with transcultural validity, whereas the peculiar sense of “native” in Euro-modern languages may be the cultural particular of a cultural formation guided by the telos of colonization.4 And where “naïve” is used in such a way as to implicate this “native” baggage, one **need not throw one’s hands up** and abandon the term, since the alternative of **distinguishing better** and **worse uses** of it remains.el

#### Their theory of violence is incorrect and unactionable. The history of Man 1, Man 2, and Man 3 presumes closed totalities that magically *switch* with a change in episteme. This model cannot build the political constituencies or models for transition that we need to deal with militarism, economic exploitation, and racism.

Paget **HENRY** Sociology @ Brown ‘**2K** *Caliban’s Reason* p. 139-141

Wynter’s reformulation is open to questions from both the poeticist and historicist traditions. For reasons of space and familiarity, I will restrict my critical remarks to questions from my own historicist position. To see some of the implications for the historicist position, we need to ask ourselves the following question: What would be the costs to Caribbean postcolonial thought if it made this shift from the politico-economic to the categorical? At least three major costs will be incurred.

First, it would require replacing the “Marxian key of the mode of production” as the one that explains domination and poverty.37 Its place would be taken by the **auto-poetics of founding schemes** that include the mode of production in a **larger symbolic totality**. Two problems arise from this suggested replacement. First is the imprecision of this epistemic totality compared to the mode of economic production. Wynter uses several terms to refer to this larger totality—the forms of social life, the mode of domination, the order informing systemic code, or the imaginaire social of Corneluis Castoriadis. Throughout my exposition for consistency I used the expression—an episteme and its order knowledge. The differences in nature and generality of these terms point to the imprecision of Wynter’s concept. To replace the Marxian mode of production, she will have to specify her oppositionally coded totalities more precisely. Second, for societies struggling so desperately with issues of economic development in an increasingly competitive world, this may indeed be a difficult shift to make, even with a more precisely defined epistemic totality. The importance of political economy to Caribbean postcolonial thought is indicated by the wide influence of political economists from James through Arthur Lewis to Clive Thomas. A radical turn toward the categorical would **significantly increase the distance between social theory and processes such as labor extraction**, **plant closings**, lobbying, and **IMF adjustment programs** that are seen to be the **moving forces of political life**. This long and complex route from the categorical to the economic and the political is not sufficiently recognized by Wynter. It needs to be mediated in a way that recognizes more specifically the **relative autonomy of the economic** **in** **spite of its original mythopoetic naming**. This semiotic priority of the cultural Wynter translates into a consistently higher (almost absolute) cybernetic ranking, which restricts both the autonomy of the economic and its ability to resist or reinscribe its original cultural construction. This results in an **underrepresentation of the economic**, in particular, and an underestimation of its importance. This is evident from the manner in which her critique of development economics moves exclusively on the level of its cultural inscription and bypasses the specific findings and projects that have emerged from its concrete practice.

The systematic underrepresenting of the economic introduces the second difficulty with Wynter’s position: the relationship between categorical processes and institutional structures. They are blurred in a way that is similar to the poststructuralist erasure of the difference between praxis and deconstruction. In theory, Wynter’s position is one of equality and mutuality, but in practice this is consistently violated. For example, in the legitimacy needs of institutional systems of power, Wynter sees “the equiprimordiality of structure and cultural conceptions in the genesis of power.”38 In other words, “the cultural aspects of power are as original as the structural aspects; each serves as a code for the other’s development.”39 However, the above **repositioning** of **political economy** is **not in line** with this position of **equiprimordiality**. This gap suggests that in actual practice Wynter has not been able to control the discursive tendencies toward overrepresenting founding categories. The underrepresenting of economic and other institutional structures is systematically related to the overrepresentation of language, sign systems, and discursive processes in Wynter’s approach. These factors take on both a centered and determinate significance that is inconsistent with the call for de-centered discourses.

This tension between categorical processes and institutional structures raises the question of the autonomy of the latter. There is little in Wynter’s texts that supports a higher cybernetic ranking for epistemic and categorical processes. On the contrary, the evidence suggests a much greater degree of autonomy for institutional structures than her ranking would entail. The differences in the temporalities of categorical/discursive processes and institutional structures constitute a good case in point. There are **many instances** in which **institutional structures** (e.g., **racism** or **capitalism**) **continue to grow** **long after** their **legitimating arguments have been deconstructed**. There are also cases (e.g., African religions in the new world) where categorical foundations continue to exist long after their institutional support has been removed. These differences in temporality suggest that categorical processes have only limited influences over institutional structures and that the latter possess selfpreservative dynamics of their own. This autonomy means that there is **no simple route** from the **categorical** to the **economic** or **political**.

The consequences of this underrepresenting of institutional structures are very evident in Wynter’s analyses of state socialism. In the cases of both Grenada and the Soviet Union, the examination moves exclusively on the categorical level. It fails to address or adequately recognize the patterns of state domination of other institutions that were related to processes of economic and political accumulation. The principle of equiprimordiality disappears in these analyses as emphasis is placed on domination generated by the liminal status of owners of private property. If we take a glance at the long and violent struggle for democracy in Haiti, the need for a stronger institutional analysis is again quite clear. While the persistence of the Noirisme/Mulatrisme opposition in Haitian society provides good grist for Wynter’s categorical mill, there can be no getting around the **hegemony** of the **military as an institution**, and the totalitarian manner in which it penetrated the judiciary, the church, the schools, the press, and other institutions of civil society. The categorical (onto-epistemic) deconstructing of the above opposition and its deeper epistemic structures could at best weaken but **not overthrow this military hegemony**. In short, greater attention to the institutional dynamics of Caribbean societies is needed if Wynter’s reformulation is to adequately address the postcolonial crisis.

#### Democratic faith discloses alternatives to anti-black ontology – democratic faith in renewal gives life meaning.

Melvin **ROGERS** Poli Sci @ Brown **’18** “Delany, Douglass, and the Danger of Political Pessimism” https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=84bw3hSu9Hw Transcribed by Victor Wu & John Turner 0:05 – 12:38

In *Dark Water* of 1920, W.E.B. DuBois offers an incisive commentary on the meaning of democracy. “Against those who would restrict the franchise,” he remarks, quote, “Such arguments show so curious a misapprehension of the foundation of the argument for democracy, that the argument must be continually restated and emphasized,” says DuBois. The statement is arresting, given the historical setting these words were penned, by an African American in the 1920s at a time when the insecurity of black life, the insecurity of black life was constantly on display – a period in which despite the Civil War amendments, Jim and Jane Crow were the law of the land and lynching was a daily reminder of how easily one could be disposed of with impunity. That the case for democracy must be restated amid its distorted expression raises an important question that I think haunts the struggle for racial equality, and indeed the very legitimacy of the American polity. What is it about democracy that justifies our faith, especially the faith of African Americans in it? Given the frequency with which African Americans are killed by police, the ongoing problems of economic inequality they experience, and the general sense that from city to city and state to state black people are subject to a fundamental insecurity not chiefly of their own making, it is difficult to suggest that commitment is or has been justified at all. It may seem more appropriate to interpret the United States as working according to plan, connecting the horror of the earliest periods of African-American life to the present moment and one story about the nation’s presumed foundational commitment to antiblackness.

Writing, for example, in response to the 2012 killing of Trayvon Martin, journalist Ta-Nehisi Coates describes Martin’s killing as the natural consequence of the functioning of American society. This is what Coates writes: “When you have a society that takes as its founding the hatred and degradation of a people, when the society inscribes the degradation in its most hallowed document and continues to inscribe hatred in its laws and policies, it is fantastic to believe that its citizens will derive no ill messaging. It is painful to say this: Trayvon Martin is not a miscarriage of justice, but of American justice itself. This is not our system malfunctioning, this is our system working as intended.” End quote.

You just gotta sit with that for a minute, right? Little can be denied, in this, I think, and we might add other voices who are trying to get us to see that antiblackness functions as a precondition for American progress. As philosopher Calvin Warren tells us, quote, “It is the humiliated, incarcerated, mutilated, and terrorized black body that serves as the vestibule for the democracy to come.” End quote. Warren stands in a tradition of thinking known as afro-pessimism, that includes scholars such as Jared Sexton and Frank Wilderson and I think more recently Christina Sharpe, all view the persistence of racial inequality and the vulnerability of black life as the inescapable afterlife of slavery**.** They raise the haunting suggestion that modernity, by which is meant that period running roughly from the Glorious Revolution to the American and French Revolutions, that modernity specifies what they call an ontology – that requires a referent outside itself for its conceptualization of identity, freedom, and progress, that requires an Other for freedom, equality, and progress to be realized. This ontological framework in which African Americans work, live, and struggle leads, as Juliet Hooker and Barnor Hess tell us, to a fundamental conundrum. This is their words, quote “One of the fundamental paradoxes of black politics is the invariable futility of directing activism towards a racially governing regime, historically founded on the constitutive exclusion and violation of blackness.” End quote.

Now, it is fashionable these days, and understandably so, to wear one’s despair on one’s sleeve. If we are honest with ourselves, if we are honest, how could we do otherwise? Moments of hope have often been dashed by the cold and cruel reality of American life. It is no wonder we find it hard to stabilize our faith in a racially just society. Here in brief is the sample of this history: In the wake of black American’s participation in the American Revolution, the nation witnessed a slow denial of their standing and contribution to the polity. With the ongoing development of slavery in the South, northern states in the 19th century slowly rescinded rights that had previously been extended to African American, African American men. Although the Civil War amendments sought to recognize the equal status of blacks, that recognition was effectively denied by the ascendancy of debt peonage, economic exploitation, lynching, and Jim and Jane Crow. The civil rights movement killed Jim and Jane Crow, but the policing and subordination of blacks was reconstituted through the rise of the carceral state, the underdeveloped welfare state, and the underfunded public education system that has been exacerbated by residential segregation. Whatever one might think of his success, the fact remains that the election of the first black president has been followed by Donald Trump, who defines his success based on removing any trace of its previous occupant. Trump’s success was, without exaggeration, cultivated through the tropes of white supremacy nativism and the commitment to police black and brown populations. Claims of white supremacy’s death of the post-racialism supposedly evidenced by the ascendancy of Barack Obama to the presidency have proven premature, yes?

At precisely this moment, however, we must confront some crucial questions. Is American democracy constitutionally at odds with our goals, or might it be conducive to building a society in which we all can live equally and at peace with one another? Are there normative resources on which one can rely to advance affirmative claims regarding racial equality, resources that are distilled not by, not by denying the ontology specified above, but by disclosing its competing alternative**?** Or must the resources of modern democracy remain forever premised on anti-blackness?

Admittedly, these appear to be empirical questions that depend on history. Or do they? In our historical calculus, we might emphasize the reconstitution of white supremacy. But we could just as easily emphasize the ways in which it has been foiled through multiple waves of racial inclusion. Those who embrace the former as our true racial reality find themselves trying to prove to those of us who have benefited from racial struggle why our success is illusory or at best temporary. But those who locate America’s identity in its resistance to white supremacy have another problem. They are often unable to see the evidence of systemic racism, or they readily describe it as anomalous foreign to the structure of our institutions and culture. If the first position seems unsatisfying because it denies human agency and gives the past too much power over the present and future, the second risks turning a blind eye to the ways white supremacy is often bolstered by institutional support and state-sanctioned violence that emanate from a culture that disregards again and again black life.

Both sides, I think, fail to distinguish between the somewhat different task of studying the past and narrativizing the past in a way that is useful for moving society in an auspicious direction, and Frederick Douglass’s felicitous formulation of the matter, quote “We have to do with the past only as we can make it useful to the present and to the future.” End quote.

These words come from Douglass’s famous 1852 address, “What to the Slave is the Fourth of July?” And in that address he does not dismiss the past, rather he stands in a line of thinkers who see in America’s past a vital principle that is both visionary and realistic. Similar to early 19th century abolitionist David Walker before him and James Baldwin well after him, Douglass deploys the principle of making and remaking that underwrites the American polity what we political theorists call the constituent power of the people that is part and parcel of the central properties of democracy. The idea of the people, Douglass knows all too well, form part of the tradition of American life, sitting alongside and often used to combat the white supremacist tendencies of the American polity. And Douglass, I think, retrieves this principle from the past and he counsels his fellows to place it in the service of the present and the future.

Now, for Douglass, African-Americans may often be alienated from American society, but they are not alien to it. This point is of great significance when you consider the thread running through much of African American thinking as struggle, that seeks to make America racially just polity. They see their efforts emerging from within and forming part of the very complex traditions of America’s moral and political language. Like them, Douglass’s aim is to emphasize those portions of the tradition that might yet deepen and extend democracy against those portions that will constrain democracy’s meaning and reach. The meaning of America, its past, and its future, is, for Douglass, something over which to struggle. But he sees struggle as an emergent property of the contested notion of who comprises the people that is central to democracy’s self-understanding.

So the question of what America really is, it seems to me, defies articulation even as we struggle to say something substantive about our ethical and political identities. This is simply because we cannot get on with figuring out where we should go and who we ought to be without narrating in the past to which we belong. But worry and I think too much about offering the true description or final narrative of that past may miss the point. We ask questions of the past, “Who are we really?” less to understand our identity once and for all, and more to aid in us making decisions about who we should become. This is the aspirational quality of the American imagination, indeed the aspirational core on which African Americans have often relied to make sense of their appeals to the nation. This is, as I believe, the perfectionist or romantic register on which many in this tradition have often worked, including Douglass himself.

So for the remainder of my remarks, I want to spend some time trying to retrieve the meaning and complex power of this aspirational vision. Believing that it is during moments of dark times, such as our current moment (at least for me, I think) that we need to recall the faith of those that came before. But just as we have in our current moment powerful reasons to lose faith and powerful reasons to believe in what the afro-pessimists offer us, Douglass had in his time a powerful alternative vision confronting his own, it’s with that vision we must now begin.

1. **Government action can reshape humanity. Defeatist attitudes ensure that the world remains the way it is**

**Glaude 16**—Professor of African American Studies and Religion at Princeton and a PhD in Religion from Princeton [Eddie S., Jr., *Democracy in Black: How Race Still Enslaves*, p. 185-197, Print]

CHANGE HOW WE VIEW GOVERNMENT

For more than three decades, we have been bludgeoned with an idea of government that has little to no concern for the public good. Big government is bad, we are told. It is inefficient, and its bloated bureaucracies are prone to corruption. Even Democrats, especially since Bill Clinton, have taken up this view. For example, Obama says, "We don't need big government; we need smart government."

For some on the right, big government is bad because it aims to distribute wealth to those who are lazy and undeserving. "Big government" is just a shorthand for dreaded entitlement programs-all too often coded language for race. In this view, "big government" is the primary agent of enforcing racial equality, taking hard-earned stuff from white Americans and giving it to undeserving others. Government cannot do such a thing, they argue, without infringing on the rights of white Americans. And even government-mandated redistribution will not solve the problem. As Barry Goldwater put the point in 1964, "No matter how we try, we cannot pass a law that will make you like me or me like you. The key to racial and religious tolerance lies not in laws alone but, ultimately, in the hearts of men." From this perspective, government plays no role in changing our racial habits. Why would we want to make it bigger?

But Goldwater failed to realize that governmental indifference can harden hearts, and government action can create conditions that soften them. **People's attitudes aren't static or untouchable**. They are molded by the quality of interactions with others, and **one of the great powers of government involves shaping those interactions-not determining them in any concrete sense, but defining the parameters within which people come to know each other and live together**. Today, for example, most Americans don't believe women should be confined to the home raising children, or subjected to crude advances and sexist remarks by men. The women's-rights movement put pressure on the government, which in turn passed laws that helped change some of our beliefs about women. Similarly, the relative progress of the 1960s did not happen merely by using the blunt instruments of the law. **Change emerged from the ways those laws, with grassroots pressure, created new patterns of interactions, and ultimately new habits**. Neither Obama's election to the presidency nor my appointment as a Princeton professor would have happened were it not for these new patterns and habits.

None of this happens overnight. It takes time and increasing vigilance to protect and secure change. I was talking with a dose friend and he mentioned a basic fact: that we were only fifteen years removed from the passage of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 when Ronald Reagan was elected president and Republicans began to dismantle the gains of the black freedom struggle. Civil rights legislation and the policies of the Great Society had just started to reshape our interactions when they started to be rolled back. We barely had a chance to imagine America anew-to pursue what full employment might look like, to let the abolition of the death penalty settle in, to question seriously the morality of putting people in prison cells, and to enact policies that would undo what the 1968 Kerner Commission described as "two Americas"­ before the attack on "big government" or, more precisely, the attack on racial equality was launched. The objective was to shrink the size of government ("to starve the beast") and to limit its domestic responsibilities to ensuring economic efficiency and national defense. Democrats eventually buckled, and this is the view of government, no matter who is in office, that we have today. It has become a kind of touchstone of faith among most Americans that government is wasteful and should be limited in its role-that it shouldn't intrude on our lives. Politicians aren't the only ones who hold this view. Many Americans do, too. **Now we can't even imagine serious talk of things like full employment or the abolition of prisons**.

**We have to change our view of government, especially when it comes to racial matters**. Government policy ensured the vote for African Americans and dismantled legal segregation. Policy established a social safety net for the poor and elderly; it put in place the conditions for the growth of our cities. **All of this didn't happen simply because of individual will** or thanks to some abstract idea of America. **It was tied up with our demands and expectations**. Goldwater was wrong. So was Reagan. And, in many ways, so is Obama. Our racial habits are shaped by the kind of society in which we live, and our government plays a big role in shaping that society. As young children, our community offers us a way of seeing the world; it lets us know what is valuable and sacred, and what stands as virtuous behavior and what does not. When Michael Brown's body was left in the street for more than four hours, it sent a dear message about the value of black lives. When everything in our society says that we should be less concerned about black folk, that they are dangerous, that no specific policies can address their misery, we say to our children and to everyone else that these people are "less than"-that they fall outside of our moral concern. We say, without using the word, that they are niggers.

**One way to change that view is to enact policies that suggest otherwise**. Or, to put it another way, to change our view of government, we must change our demands of government. **For example**, for the past fifty years African American unemployment has been twice that of white unemployment. The 2013 unemployment rate for African Americans stood at 13.1 percent, the highest annual black unemployment rate in more than seventy years. Social scientists do not generally agree on the causes of this trend. Some attribute it to the fact that African Americans are typically the "last hired and first fired." Others point to changes in the nature of the economy; still others point to overt racial discrimination in the labor market. No matter how we account for the numbers, the fact remains that most Americans see double-digit black unemployment as "normal." However, a large-scale, comprehensive jobs agenda with a living wage designed to put Americans, and explicitly African Americans, to work would go a long way toward uprooting the racial habits that inform such a view. It would counter the nonsense that currently stands as a reason for long-term black unemployment in public debate: black folk are lazy and don't want to work.

**If we hold the view that government plays a crucial role in ensuring the public good**-if we believe that all Americans, no matter their race or class, can be vital contributors to our beloved community-**then we reject the idea that some populations are disposable**, that some people can languish in the shadows while the rest of us dance in the light. The question ''Am I my brother's or my sister's keeper?" is not just a question for the individual or a mantra to motivate the private sector. It is a question answered in the social arrangements that aim to secure the goods and values we most cherish as a community. In other words, we need an idea of government that reflects the value of all Americans, not just white Americans or a few people with a lot of money.

We need government seriously committed to racial justice. As a nation, we can never pat ourselves on the back about racial matters. We have too much blood on our hands. Remembering that fact-our inheritance, as Wendell Berry said-does not amount to beating ourselves over the head, or wallowing in guilt, or trading in race cards. Remembering our national sins serves as a check and balance against national hubris. We're reminded of what we are capable of, and our eyes are trained to see that ugliness when it rears its head. But when we disremember-when we forget about the horrors of lynching, lose sight of how African Americans were locked into a dual labor market because of explicit racism, or ignore how we exported our racism around the world-we free ourselves from any sense of accountability. Concern for others and a sense of responsibility for the whole no longer matter. Cruelty and indifference become our calling cards.

We have to isolate those areas in which long-standing trends of racial inequality short-circuit the life chances of African Americans. In addition to a jobs agenda, **we need a comprehensive government response to the problems of public education and mass incarceration**. **And I do mean a government response**. Private interests have overrun both areas, as privatization drives school reform (and the education of our children is lost in the boisterous battles between teachers' unions and private interests) and as big business makes enormous profits from the warehousing of black and brown people in prisons. Let's be clear: private interests or market-based strategies will not solve the problems we face as a country or bring about the kind of society we need. We have to push for massive government investment in early childhood education and in shifting the center of gravity of our society from punishment to restorative justice. We can begin to enact the latter reform by putting an end to the practice of jailing children. Full stop. We didn't jail children in the past. We don't need to now.

# 2NC

## GND CA

### S: Geoengineering

#### GND stops capitals geoengineering plans

Surprise, PhD, 20

(Kevin Surprise (@KevinSurprise) is a Visiting Lecturer in Environmental Studies at Mount Holyoke College. https://mronline.org/2020/07/30/solar-geoengineering-is-incompatible-with-a-radical-green-new-deal/)

Solar geoengineering, specifically Stratospheric Aerosol Injection (SAI), is a proposed climate technology that could cool the planet—quickly and cheaply—by continually spraying megatons of sulfur dioxide into the lower stratosphere to reflect some incoming solar radiation back to space. In climate policy, solar geoengineering has long been considered fringe, at best a last-ditch “plan B” in the event of a climate emergency. But recent activity around the technology compels a shift in perspective: solar geoengineering is not a futuristic “plan B,” but a rapidly developing pillar of capital’s climate “plan A.” Solar geoengineering is receiving renewed discussion because of brief mention in the House Select Committee’s Climate Action Plan. The plan recommends following guidance from the National Academies of Sciences’ forthcoming report on “reflecting sunlight to cool earth” (two briefings from this committee were released in June). Other recent moves include steps taken by the Harvard Solar Geoengineering Research Program (HSGRP) to advance outdoor SAI field-experiments, Congressional appropriation of $4 million to NOAA to support federal solar geoengineering research, and release of a report by the Union of Concerned Scientists endorsing cautious research. In the midst of rising emissions and climate inaction, many scientists and policymakers are coming to the conclusion that cheap, fast-acting technologies require research and investment. Moreover, a budding consensus is emerging around key norms and best-case scenarios: solar geoengineering research should proceed cautiously, cooperatively, and transparently. Governance should be internationally coordinated and include input from publics and civil society, particularly from the Global South. If deployed, it should be gradual, moderate, and temporary, with the aim of “buying time” for emissions cuts, and providing “humanitarian” relief to those vulnerable to near-term climate risks. This is powerful narrative. Yet, even if such extremely optimistic scenarios were to obtain—a highly dubious prospect—solar geoengineering would remain antithetical to ecosocialism and to a radical GND. There are four key reasons for this: the research is largely funded by billionaires and wealthy philanthropic organizations with ties to finance and technology capital; solar geoengineering is being designed to “buy time” for market-driven decarbonization (to explicitly avoid revolutionary change); the “humanitarian” discourse around the technology represents a form of technocratic, liberal paternalism; and, as states will have ultimate control over deployment, the prospect of militarization cannot be ruled out.

#### Green New Deal solves community empowerment and redistributes both wealth and power.

Rhiana **GUNN-WRIGHT** Climate Policy Director @ Roosevelt Inst. ‘**20** in *Winning the Green New Deal* eds. Prakash & Guido Girgenti p. ecopy not paginated

The Green New Deal as Public Policy

Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez has described the Green New Deal resolution as a “request for proposals,” and sure enough, communities and leaders from across the country have begun to translate the vision and framework of the resolution into concrete policy proposals. Although still nascent and evolving, these GND policies share four characteristics that differentiate them from traditional climate and economic policies.

First, all GND policy, whether narrow or broad, serves a triple bottom line: achieve the decarbonization goals set out by H.R. 109, reduce income inequality, and redress systemic oppression. The Green New Deal for Public Housing, for example, will retrofit and upgrade 1.2 million federally managed homes, reducing their carbon emissions while also creating hundreds of thousands of jobs. Grants for paid workforce development programs will train public housing residents and prepare them for the 250,000 jobs—all paid at prevailing wage levels—that the bill creates. All grant applications from local organizations must also be approved by resident councils, giving residents unprecedented control over how money invested in their homes will be spent. New York’s Climate Leadership and Community Protection Act aims for a triple bottom line with equitable investment, mandating New York reach net-zero greenhouse gas emissions; establishes intermediate decarbonization goals— including 70 percent renewable energy by 2030; and requires that marginalized communities receive no less than 35 percent of the bill’s investment.

Second, GND policy works to shape markets and create demand so that low-carbon and no-carbon goods become the default, rather than the alternative to carbon-intensive goods. Maine’s Green New Deal and Los Angeles’s Green New Deal include renewable portfolio standards that require 80 percent of all energy be generated from renewable sources by 2040 and 2036, respectively, which will significantly increase the demand for renewable energy. New York City’s Climate Mobilization Act achieves a similar shift in demand and energy markets but through a different mechanism. By altering the city’s building code to include emissions caps for medium-sized and large buildings, requiring all new residential and commercial buildings to include either green roofs or solar installations, and adding wind to the Department of Buildings’ “toolbox” of allowable renewable energy technologies, the bill greatly expands markets for low-carbon building materials, renewable energy, and related technology, in New York and nationally. Third, GND policy mobilizes public investment for sector-wide decarbonization, while ensuring that the investment provides workers, marginalized populations, and vulnerable communities with both a path into the new economy and protection from disaster. For example, the Green New Deal plan put forward by Senator Elizabeth Warren would invest $10 trillion—public and private—over ten years, with $2 trillion going toward green manufacturing and research; $15.5 billion toward sustainable agriculture and localizing food systems; and at least $1 trillion to frontline and fence-line communities. The Green New Deal plan from Senator Bernie Sanders would invest $16 trillion, including $2 trillion toward renewable energy and modernizing our electric grid; approximately $3 trillion to weatherize and retrofit low- and middle-income homes and small businesses; and roughly $2.7 trillion to help workingclass families purchase electric vehicles. Sanders’s plan would also invest $40 billion in a Climate Justice Resiliency Fund that would be used for projects as varied as community centers and shelters with reliable backup power on one hand, and, on the other, wetland restoration and climate-related adaptation for frontline communities. Finally, GND policy works to build power within and among those who are marginalized by prioritizing these communities in funding, policy design, and implementation, enabling local control whenever possible. The GND resolution requires that democratic processes, “inclusive of and led by frontline and vulnerable communities and workers,” be used to “plan, implement, and administer” the Green New Deal at the local level. So far, legislators have listened.

With the exception of the Climate Mobilization Act, all of the legislation discussed in this section positions frontline communities as drivers of climate policy—whether these are environmental justice working groups, transition advisory councils, or commissions on a just transition. New York’s environmental justice working group “will establish criteria to identify disadvantaged communities for the purposes of co-pollutant reductions, greenhouse gas emissions reductions… and the allocation of investments” that result from the Climate Leadership and Community Protection Act. Similarly, at the federal level, the Climate Equity Act introduced by Senator Kamala Harris and Representative Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez would establish a Climate and Environmental Equity Office, install a senior adviser for Climate and Environmental Justice in sixteen federal agencies, and create “an equity screen” for all federal rules or regulations related to climate.

# 1NR

#### 2 – Desegregation – applying the essential facilities doctrine to school segregation solves their education offense AND would allow them to make arguments about reconceptualizing how the public understands what “monopolization” is.

**Wilson 21** (Erika Wilson, Wade Edwards Distinguished Scholar, Thomas Willis Lambeth Distinguished Chair in Public Policy, Associate Professor of Law, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, “Monopolizing Whiteness”, [https://harvardlawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/05/134-Harv.-L.-Rev.-2382-1.pdf//af](https://harvardlawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/05/134-Harv.-L.-Rev.-2382-1.pdf/af))

V .**CONCLUSION**

This Article analyzed the prevalence and persistence of white student segregation in racially diverse metropolitan areas. It theorized that white student racial segregation in racially diverse metropolitan areas is a byproduct of social closure. Using examples from three predominately white school districts, it provided an account of how **laws surrounding school district boundary lines** facilitate race-neutral forms of **social closure**. Owing to the historical and modern alignment of whiteness with power and resources, it argued that social closure leads to predominately white school districts **monopolizing** high quality schools. It further argued that the monopolization creates stark racial disparities between school districts within metropolitan areas. Those regional disparities have harmful consequences for American democratic norms that go unaddressed.

Equal protection doctrine is the common legal framework used to regulate racial disparities in public education. Yet the Article demonstrated that equal protection doctrine is ill-suited to address white student segregation because it does not recognize monopolization as a legally cognizable harm. Nor does it account for the broader harms that racial disparities in public education has on American democratic norms. Instead, equal protection doctrine with its stringent subjective intent requirements and decontextualization of the significance of racially identifiable schools, allows white student racial segregation to persist unabated. Indeed, the doctrine unwittingly serves as a conduit through which whites can engage in second order social closure that facilitate monopolization of high-quality schools without legal scrutiny.

The Article therefore turned to a **framework used to regulate monopolization** for guidance. It demonstrated how principles from antitrust law – namely the **essential facilities doctrine** - **if extrapolated to the public-school context** is a useful lens through which to **conceptualize the monopolization** and harms to democracy caused by white student segregation. It also demonstrated a potential remedial path forward. Most importantly, it provides a blueprint for **courts, legislators, and the public** at large to **reframe the way** in which white student **segregation is viewed** and to consider alternative rationales and mechanisms for addressing white student segregation **and monopolization** of high-quality schools.